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ABSTRACT
This Article is based on a presentation at the 2012 conference on “Struggles for
Recognition: Individuals, Peoples, and States” co-sponsored by Mercer University,
the Concerned Philosophers for Peace, and the Carnegie Council for Ethics in
International Affairs, and it seeks to help combat our human tendency to demonize
the Other and thus to contribute in some small way to the reduction of unnecessary
conflict and violence. The discussion takes the form of a conversation in a bar
between four imagined protagonists, who have participated in the conference, and
Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, who is having a bad day questioning his immersion in
a violent world. Their conversation touches on many different areas including
political philosophy, jurisprudence, psychology, political conversation, international
relations, legal history, comparative law, and even theology. Thus the conversation
ranges from Francis Fukuyama’s notorious thesis, expounded in his 1992 book The
End of History and the Last Man, about the ideological superiority of liberal
democracy (and the paradigmatic type of human beings who inhabit liberal
democracies at the end of History) to the values underlying medieval animal trials
and The Confessions of Saint Augustine, and it culminates in an apocalyptic thought
experiment involving a literal last man.
AUTHOR NOTE:
Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, Oxford University (B.A. 1974;
(M.A., 1979)); University of Michigan (LL.M., 1983). At the Concerned
Philosophers for Peace Conference held at Mercer University at the end of October
2012 at which I presented the talk that is the basis for this Article, I explained that I
felt a bit of an interloper as I am not a trained professional philosopher. However, I
have had great interest in the subject of philosophy ever since studying Jurisprudence
as an undergraduate law student in the early 1970s. This interest received a
significant boost following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the
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publication in 1992 of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man,
which figures prominently in this Article. I am grateful to wonderful colleagues like
Shawn Loht, Jack Sammons, and David Ritchie who have patiently tried to help me
learn more of what I need to know. I am additionally grateful to David for organizing
the conference and for inviting me to participate in it, to Jack for a lively and
challenging email exchange that helped to develop the thinking reflected in this
Article and for his comments on an earlier draft, and to former Mercer Law School
Dean Gary Simson, a true scholar-dean, for the summer research grant that supported
the writing of this Article and for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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C

onsider if you will two contrasting works of imagination. The first
is a famous, or perhaps infamous, piece of dialogue at the
beginning and the end of the 1971 movie Dirty Harry. In both scenes
Clint Eastwood’s character, Inspector Harry Callahan, points his gun
at a suspect whom he has wounded after an exchange of gunfire. When
the suspect starts eyeing his firearm, which is within reach, Callahan
says:
I know what you’re thinking: “Did he fire six shots or only
five?” Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement I kind
of lost track myself. But being as this is a .44 Magnum, the
most powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your
head clean off, you’ve got to ask yourself one question: Do I
feel lucky? Well, do ya, punk?1

In the first scene, Callahan has just killed two armed bank robbers.
The wounded suspect, the third robber, submits and then discovers that
Callahan’s gun was empty. Callahan had already fired six shots.2 In
the second scene, the wounded suspect goes for his gun and is fatally
shot by Callahan, who it turns out had fired only five shots during a
preceding running gun battle.3 We can usefully fold into this dialogue
another famous, or infamous, piece of dialogue from the 1983 Dirty
Harry movie Sudden Impact in which Harry Callahan kills three armed
robbers in a coffee shop, confronts a slightly wounded fourth armed
robber who has put a gun to the head of a hostage, points his gun at the
robber, and utters the memorable line “Go ahead; make my day.” Here
again, the robber submits.4
The second work of imagination is an extract from a well-known
poem Strange Meeting by the First World War poet Wilfred Owen:

1

2

3

4

DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971). The quoted language is from the first scene.
The dialogue in the second scene is very similar but there are subtle variations,
including the addition of a second use of the term “punk” in the first line after
“thinking.”
Id. In this scene, Callahan sees a bank robbery in progress and intervenes. For
the scene, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Xjr2hnOHiM.
Id. In this scene, Callahan chases the serial killer Scorpio who grabs a young
boy as a hostage. Callahan wounds Scorpio in the shoulder and the boy escapes.
For the scene, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7NciGVuHE&
feature=iv&src_vid=8Xjr2hnOHiM&annotation_id=annotation_563540.
SUDDEN IMPACT (Warner Bros. 1983). In this scene, Callahan intervenes to end
an armed robbery taking place in the coffee shop. For the scene, see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ishbTwXf1g.
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It seemed that out of the battle I escaped
Down some profound dull tunnel, long since scooped
Through granites which titanic wars had groined.
Yet also there encumbered sleepers groaned,
Too fast in thought or death to be bestirred.
Then, as I probed them, one sprang up, and stared
With piteous recognition in fixed eyes,
Lifting distressful hands as if to bless.
And by his smile, I knew that sullen hall;
By his dead smile I knew we stood in Hell.
With a thousand fears that vision’s face was grained;
Yet no blood reached there from the upper ground,
And no guns thumped, or down the flues made moan.
“Strange friend,” I said, “Here is no cause to mourn.”
“None,” said the other, “Save the undone years,
The hopelessness. Whatever hope is yours,
Was my life also. . . . .
I am the enemy you killed, my friend.
I knew you in the dark; for so you frowned
Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed.
I parried; but my hands were loath and cold.
Let us sleep now. . .”5

Each of these two works of imagination portrays extreme
violence—violent death or the threat of violent death. In the Dirty
Harry movies, the violence is internal to a society, the United States,
and the deaths are those of criminal suspects many would characterize
as “enemies of society.” In the Owen poem, the violence is between
societies at war with one another, Great Britain and Germany, and the
deaths are those of a German soldier and a British soldier who are
“enemies” and foreign foes of one another.
In each case, the violence is tragic, as perhaps all violence
ultimately is, not least because of its normalization.6 Perhaps, indeed,
5

6

Wilfred Owen, STRANGE MEETING (1919). The poem was written in the spring
or early summer of 1918. Kenneth Simcox, Strange Meeting, The Wilfred Owen
Association (2000), http://www.wilfredowen.org.uk/poetry/strange-meeting.
Owen was killed one week before the end of the War. This Day in History:
November 4, 1918: Poet Wilfred Owen killed in action, HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/poet-wilfred-owen-killed-in-action.
This tragic normalization is acknowledged in the Bible when the first particular
sin committed by a human being after expulsion from Paradise is Cain’s murder
of his brother Abel. Genesis 4:1-12. For a wonderfully insightful treatment of
violence as the central problem in the human condition and as the problem that
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the protagonists in the two cases could have avoided at least some of
the tragedy by making a different decision in the deadly situation they
faced—perhaps Harry Callahan could have refrained from daring the
criminal suspects in front of him and running the risk of provoking
another fatal outcome; and perhaps the German soldier and the British
soldier could have chosen to surrender rather than to fight, much as the
wounded third armed robber in Dirty Harry or the slightly wounded
fourth armed robber in Sudden Impact chose to do. But the situations
were already pathological by then and the room for maneuver very
constrained. The deeper tragedy is that these pathological situations
and the deadly violence they engendered were the culmination of
countless individual and collective decisions about how to treat others,
each decision having an incremental causative effect in socially
constructing the “punks” or the “foreign foe” and in producing the
ultimate tragic outcome.
Despite these similarities, the two works could not be more
different. The Dirty Harry movies do not move beyond the deadly
violence. Indeed, they portray such violence as the only solution to
dealing with the simple, one dimensional “punks” that plague society.7
The Owen poem does move beyond the deadly violence, and it does so
by taking us to a place beyond death in which each soldier, with whom
we are of course invited to identify, can recognize “the enemy,” the
“foreign foe,” as a complex, multidimensional human being just like
himself, to a place indeed in which he, and we, can recognize him as a
“friend.” This is a dramatic and radical shift in perspective and Owen
wants us to make it this side of the grave.
One goal of this Article, then, is to help avoid or minimize the type
of pathological situations and associated deadly violence portrayed in
these two works by supporting Owen’s poetic argument for making
this shift in perspective with an extended philosophical argument. This
argument is aimed at improving the quality of the causative decisions
about how to treat others that can otherwise lead to such tragic
outcomes. However, there is a second goal too. The pathological
situations and associated deadly violence in these two works can also
be seen as extreme metaphors for lesser degrees of conflict and

7

is centrally addressed in the Hebrew Bible, see R ABBI J ONATHAN S ACKS , N OT
IN G OD ’ S N AME : C ONFRONTING R ELIGIOUS V IOLENCE (2015).
Much of the popularity of the Dirty Harry movies lies in the perceived failures
of the criminal justice system to address the problem of violent crime
effectively. See, e.g., PATRICK MCGILLIGAN, CLINT: THE LIFE AND LEGEND, 209
(1999).
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associated “violence,” whether that violence is physical or
psychological, and the argument is aimed at improving the quality of
causative decisions about how to treat others that result in these lesser
conflicts and associated “violence” as well.
However, the argument is not utopian, aimed at eliminating
conflict completely. That would probably be undesirable anyway.
Instead, it is aimed at cultivating a particular kind of “recognition”
among parties to conflict that will help promote a healthier resolution
to conflicts, both those that occur within a national society and those
that occur between societies. The goal is to help counteract our all-toohuman tendency to demonize the “Other” or, given the context of the
imagined conversation below—and if I may be permitted a
neologism—to “punkify” the “Other.” When we do this, we strip the
“Other” of his or her humanity. And even when we dialogue with the
“Other,” often we do not really connect and we might as well be
talking to an “empty chair.” The challenge, then, is to discover how to
put a real human being in the chair—not a “punkified” caricature. The
argument proceeds in the form of another exercise of the
imagination—an imaginary conversation with Inspector Harry
Callahan. It will seek to persuade him to shift from the perspective of
Dirty Harry to the perspective of Wilfred Owen. And if you would
enjoy the irony, you can even imagine the conversation taking place
with an empty chair (although I hope that the chair will appear to be
filled by a more human and sympathetic character by the end of it).8
But first we must set the scene.
SETTING THE SCENE:
Professor Polly Anna Hope, a faculty member at Mercer
University Law School, has just made three new friends at a
8

At the Philosophers for Peace Conference itself, and given Clint Eastwood’s
then recent performance at the 2012 Republican Convention, during which he
talked to an imagined President Obama sitting in an empty chair, I was unable to
resist the temptation to conduct this conversation by talking to an empty chair in
which I asked the audience to imagine Clint Eastwood was sitting as Dirty
Harry. However, the reader will understand that what follows is an imaginary
conversation that in no way should be understood as necessarily representing the
views of the real life actor/director known as Clint Eastwood. He is definitely
“in role” as Dirty Harry. The reader should also assume that the fictional
Inspector Callahan or Dirty Harry, as portrayed here, has no objection to the
recording of our conversation with him and to publication of the transcript of
that conversation with notes.
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Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference on “Struggles for
Recognition: Nonviolent Movements for Individual and Group
Recognition” being held on the Mercer campus in her home town of
Macon, Georgia. At the end of the first day’s proceedings they have
dinner at a restaurant in town and then decide to go to a local bar, “The
Wishful Thinker,” for a nightcap. As they went to dinner straight from
the conference, they still have the materials they used in various
presentations they made during the day. Sitting at the bar is someone
who bears an uncanny resemblance to Clint Eastwood, aka Inspector
Harry Callahan or Dirty Harry.9 Intrigued, they go up to the bar, sit
down, and order some drinks. Noticing that the object of their curiosity
is staring into his glass and looking rather glum, Professor Hope
engages him in conversation.
Professor Hope: Excuse me, I don’t mean to intrude, but aren’t
you. . . . ?
Dirty Harry: Yeah, I’m Harry Callahan, what about it?
Professor Hope: Well, it’s just that you seem rather down in the
dumps, and I was wondering if you would like to talk about whatever
is bothering you.
Dirty Harry: I don’t think so. Thanks anyway.
Professor Hope (persistently): Are you sure? My friends and I are
attending a Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference at Mercer
University here in Macon. My name is Polly Anna Hope; I teach
Comparative Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). And
these are my friends—Professor Telly O. Logie: he’s a professional
philosopher (his nickname is “Kojak” by the way)10; Professor Rhett
Roe: he is a legal historian; and Father Francis Pope: he teaches at a

9

10

Readers who find their credulity strained by the notion that one might encounter
Clint Eastwood, aka Inspector Callahan or Dirty Harry, in a bar in Macon,
Georgia are referred to http://gatewaymacon.org/top-5-lists/movies-filmedmacon.com (discussing the films that have been made in Macon, including
TROUBLE WITH THE CURVE, starring Clint Eastwood). See TROUBLE WITH THE
CURVE (Malpaso Productions 2012).
For the benefit of those who are not of a certain age, Kojak was an American TV
series in the 1970s starring the actor Aristotelis “Telly” Savalas as the title
character, Lieutenant Theodore “Theo” Kojak, a bald detective in the New York
City Police Department with a predilection for Tootsie Roll Pops and for
uttering the phrase “Who loves ya, baby?” See Raymond Hernandez, Telly
Savalas, Actor, Dies at 70; Played ‘Kojak’ in 70’s TV Series, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
23, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/23/obituaries/telly-savalas-actordies-at-70-played-kojak-in-70-s-tv-series.html.
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Roman Catholic seminary. So we’re quite a diverse bunch, and quite
thoughtful. You never know; we might have something helpful to say.
Dirty Harry: A bunch of egg head peaceniks—I doubt it. But I
must admit, I am experiencing something of what you clever Dicks
would call “an existential crisis,” a moment of serious “angst.”
Professor Hope (unable to resist a bit of arguably inappropriate
academic humor): But “angst” is good. For a moment there I was
worried it was “ennui.” So, what seems to be the source of this
“angst”?
Dirty Harry: There seems to be so much violence and violent
death in the world–wars, terrorism, mass murders, other murders and
maiming. Everywhere you look there seems to be violent conflict. And
it seems, too, that the usual response to violence is yet more violence.
Hell, look at me. In my movies, I often resort to force and violence as
a solution to conflict, as in “Go ahead; make my day” or “[Y]ou’ve got
to ask yourself one question: Do I feel lucky? Well, do ya, punk”? And
then, as often as not, I blow them away. My character lives in a world
full of “punks.” But, recently I have been wondering whether there
might be a better way to a better world. The trouble is, I just can’t see
what that might be. It’s getting me down, so here I am in this bar.
Professor Hope: You know, I think maybe we can help. Perhaps
Professor Logie can get us started.
I. THE LONG MARCH TOWARD “THE END OF HISTORY”: FROM
THRONES TO CHAIRS IN THE “STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION”—
SPIRITUAL JUSTICE PART ONE
Professor Logie: Well, Inspector Callahan, my views have been
greatly influenced by what one could call “the Hegel-KojèveFukuyama school of political philosophy.”11
Dirty Harry: The what? What the hell is that?
11

The views presented by Professor Logie in this exchange with Dirty Harry are
based on the argument in F RANCIS F UKUYAMA , T HE E ND OF H ISTORY AND
THE L AST M AN (1992). As we will see below, the “struggle for recognition” is
central to Fukuyama’s thesis that modern liberal democracy represents the
endpoint in the historical evolution of mankind’s political ideas. In articulating
this thesis Fukuyama draws upon Hegel’s account of a Universal History as
interpreted by Alexandre Kojève in the 1930s. For Fukuyama’s discussion of
Hegel’s Universal History and the Hegelian dialectic between societies
culminating in the “end of history,” see id. at 59-64. For Fukuyama’s discussion
of Kojève and his work as Hegel’s “greatest interpreter in the twentieth
century,” see id. at 65-67.
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Professor Logie: It’s a little complicated and will take a while to
explain; but I do need to explain it before you will be able to see my
main point about violence—if you can bear with me.
Dirty Harry: Well, I haven’t got anything better to do. And it
should be entertaining to see you get your academic knickers in a
tangle.
Professor Logie (somewhat perplexed and embarrassed by this
reference to his academic knickers12): In his book The End of History
and the Last Man, published in 1992, Francis Fukuyama gives an
account of a “Universal History” that is “coherent and directional” and
that culminates in the “end of history,”13 not in the sense that
important events will cease to occur but in the sense that “the end
point of mankind’s ideological evolution” has been reached with the
realization of “the final form of human government.”14 Fukuyama’s
particular thesis is that the economic and political organization of
societies has developed through different stages from the violent
situation of the “first men” in a “state of nature” at the beginning of
History to their culmination in the relatively peaceful situation of the
“last men” in liberal democracy at the end of History. Liberal
democracy is thus the best arrangement and superior to all alternatives
such as “monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy, fascism, communist
totalitarianism, or whatever ideology [people] happened to believe
in.”15
Dirty Harry: What? Are you telling me that the “end of history” is
reached when a bunch of liberal Democrats are in charge of
everything? I bet you voted for Obama, didn’t you?
Professor Logie: No, I’m not saying that; and I’m not telling you
whom I voted for.
Dirty Harry: You don’t have to. You academics are all the same.
Anyway, do go on. What are you saying, then?
Professor Logie (feeling quite smug because he actually voted for
the Green Party ticket): Fukuyama defines liberal democracy as “the
doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty”16 and
12

13
14

15
16

Professor Logie is perplexed by Dirty Harry’s apparent use of this common
expression to suggest his anticipation that the argument might become tangled
and confused.
FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at xii.
Id. at xi-xii (quoting from Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, N AT ’ L
I NTEREST 4 (Summer 1989)).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 42.
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understands it as comprising three main elements: (a) Political
liberalism, which is “a rule of law that recognizes certain individual
rights or freedoms from government control”17; (b) Democracy, which
is “the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political
power, that is the right of all citizens to vote and participate in
politics,” and which “can be thought of as yet another liberal right”18;
and (c) Economic liberalism, which is “the recognition of the right of
free economic activity and economic exchange based on private
property and markets” and which also goes by the name of
“capitalism” or “free-market economics.”19
Dirty Harry: Okay, I get that liberal democracy is not necessarily
a bunch of liberal Democrats being in charge of everything. But why
does the historical process culminate in these particular economic and
political arrangements rather than in some fascist or communist
dictatorship?
Professor Logie: Integrating the logic of modern natural science
and the Anglo-Saxon account of liberalism, represented by Hobbes
and Locke, with the Continental European account of liberalism,
represented by Hegel-Kojève, Fukuyama concludes that the process of
historical development must inevitably culminate in the idea of liberal
democracy and that there is no set of economic and political
arrangements superior to liberal democracy. He claims further that this
conclusion is verified by the apparent verdict of history, consisting in
the triumph of liberal democracy over its competitors in the twentieth
century, such as fascism or communism.
The deep explanation for this theoretical conclusion and for the
apparent verdict of history is rooted in certain truths about human
nature or in “a trans-historical concept of man.”20 Specifically, it is
rooted in the tripartite division of the soul first explicated by Plato but
17
18

19

20

Id.
Id. at 43. Fukuyama stresses that “[i]t is possible for a country to be liberal
without being particularly democratic” and “[i]t is also possible for a country to
be democratic without being liberal, that is without protecting the rights of
individuals and minorities.” Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44. Fukuyama stresses that “there are many possible interpretations of this
rather broad definition of economic liberalism, ranging from the United States of
Ronald Reagan and the Britain of Margaret Thatcher to the social democracies
of Scandinavia and the relatively statist regimes in Mexico and India.” Id.
See id. at 137-39. For discussion of the difficulty in justifying a particular
understanding of human nature or “trans-historical concept of man,” see id. at
364 n.7.
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accepted, albeit with varying terminology, by Western philosophers up
to Rousseau.21 I need to explain all this in more detail so that I can
highlight my main point.
Dirty Harry: Knock yourself out; I’m all ears. And I’m still
looking forward to you getting your academic knickers all in a tangle.
Professor Logie (still embarrassed, though not quite as much as
before): I will try to avoid doing that. Well, anyway, in the Republic
Plato famously gives a metaphysical account of the soul that also
represents a human psychology—an account of human nature, if you
will. He identifies three parts to the soul—a reasoning part, a
“spirited” part, and a desiring part that is the source of bodily appetites
and material desires.22 Fukuyama grounds his own “end of history”
thesis in the following understanding of Plato’s account:
Plato in the Republic . . . noted that there were three parts to
the soul, a desiring part, a reasoning part, and a part that he
called thymos, or “spiritedness.” Much of human behavior
can be explained as a combination of the first two parts,
desire and reason: desire induces men to seek things outside
themselves, while reason or calculation shows them the best
way to get them. But in addition, human beings seek
recognition of their own worth, or of the people, things, or
principles that they invest with worth. The propensity to
invest the self with a certain value, and to demand
recognition for that value, is what in today’s popular
language we would call “self-esteem.” The propensity to feel
self-esteem arises out of the part of the soul called thymos. It
is like an innate human sense of justice. People believe that
they have a certain worth, and when other people treat them
as though they are worth less than that, they experience the
emotion of anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to
their own sense of worth, they feel shame, and when they are
evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel
pride. The desire for recognition, and the accompanying
emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the human
personality critical to political life.23
21

22

23

Id. at 162-63, 368 n.5. See infra note 41 (discussing the varying terminology
used by Western philosophers over the centuries).
For an accessible treatment of Plato’s “tripartite theory of the self or the soul or
psyche or personality” as “the form, idea, or essence of man” and the arena of
“psychological conflict,” see T.Z. L AVINE , F ROM S OCRATES TO S ARTRE : T HE
P HILOSOPHIC Q UEST 49-53 (1984).
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at xvi-xvii. For Fukuyama’s more detailed
discussion of Plato’s account in the Republic, see id. at 163-66, 183. Fukuyama
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In addition to emotions such as anger, shame, and pride, as well as
the desire for recognition, courage is rooted in thymos.24 It is also the
psychological seat of other virtues such as selflessness, idealism,
morality, self-sacrifice, honorability, generosity, and publicspiritedness, as well as resistance to tyranny.25 However, as we will
see, thymos has a “dark side” as well as a more benign side.
The historical process has been driven forward by the search to
overcome the specific contradiction peculiar to each particular form of
human society and to achieve a “form of social and political
organization that is completely satisfying to human beings in their most
essential characteristics.”26 In other words, it has been driven forward
by the search to satisfy all three parts of the soul. Two main forces or
“mechanisms” explain the “directionality and coherence of History.”27
First, the historical process has been driven forward by “the
progressive unfolding of modern natural science” and economic
imperatives rooted in the desiring part of the soul:
[T]he progressive unfolding of modern natural science . . .
emanates from the desiring part of the soul, which was
liberated in early modern times and turned to the unlimited
accumulation of wealth. This unlimited accumulation was
made possible because of an alliance that was formed

24
25

26
27

distinguishes analytically between thymos and the desire for recognition. Thus
“Plato’s thymos is . . . the psychological seat of Hegel’s desire for recognition;”
consequently, “[t]hymos and the ‘desire for recognition’ differ somewhat insofar
as the former refers to a part of the soul that invests objects with value, whereas
the latter is an activity of thymos that demands that another consciousness share
the same valuation.” Id. at 165.
Id. at 163, 183.
Id. at 171, 181. See also L AVINE , supra note 22, at 49. “[The] spirited element
[is] expressed in emotional drives such as anger, aggression, ambition, pride,
protectiveness, honor, loyalty, courage.” Thymos is also clearly implicated in the
process of self-evaluation and self-criticism—for example, regarding whether
one has lived up to accepted standards of virtuous behavior. See F UKUYAMA ,
supra note 11, at 164 (discussing Socrates’ story about Leontius’ inner struggle
over whether to look at a pile of corpses and contrasting the anger Leontius feels
after losing the battle with the pride he would have felt had he won it).
FUKUYAMA, supra note 11, at 135-36.
Id. at xiv (referring to natural science as “a regulator or mechanism”); id. at 144
(referring to “an alternative ‘mechanism’. . . based on ‘the struggle for
recognition’”).
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between desire and reason: capitalism is inextricably bound
to modern natural science.28

In fact, “the logic of advanced industrialization, determined by
modern natural science, creates a strong predisposition in favor of
capitalism and market economics,”29 that is, economic liberalism.30
Although there is “a very strong overall correlation between
advancing socio-economic modernization and the emergence of new
democracies,”31 modern natural science and advanced industrialization
cannot fully explain why societies would adopt political liberalism as
well as economic liberalism.32 The reason is that humans are more
than economic animals.33 As Fukuyama puts it: Man is more than
“Economic Man;” he is also “thymotic man.”34
Dirty Harry: “Thymotic man”! I think this might be the knickers
tangle I’ve been waiting for. “The Thymotic Man” does sound like a
good title for a movie, though.
Professor Logie (no longer embarrassed and even a little irritated
at these continued taunts and anticipatory Schadenfreude over the
tangling of his academic knickers, but suddenly realizing that these
exchanges are a mild example of thymotic conflict): Yes, Fukuyama
points out that the concepts of thymos and the desire for recognition do
sound very strange and unfamiliar to us nowadays.35 However, they
are critical to Fukuyama’s thesis and, I suspect, to addressing your
own existential crisis as the conversation develops further.
So, in addition to the mechanism of natural science, and for a much
longer time—for thousands of years in fact—the historical process has
also been driven forward by a second force or mechanism: the desire
28

29
30
31
32

33
34
35

Id. at 204. For more extended discussion of the role of modern natural science,
see id. at xiv-xv, 72-81. For discussion of why the directionality provided by
modern natural science is unlikely to be reversed, see id. at 82-88.
Id. at 108-09.
Id. at xv, 205-06.
Id. at 112. See also id. at 205-06 (exploring the reasons for the correlation).
See id. at xv, 112-25, 131-35, 238-44 (discussing the ultimate failure of various
attempts to demonstrate that economic liberalism inevitably leads to political
liberalism).
Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 145, 162, 189-90 (noting the thoroughgoing “economization” of our
thinking over the last few centuries). This is largely due to the influence on our
thinking of the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, represented in particular by
Hobbes and Locke. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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for recognition rooted in the thymotic part of the soul.36 This second
mechanism explains both why the historical process eventually
culminates in liberal democracy and why there are deviations and
discontinuities along the way.37
Recall that psychologically thymos operates as something “like an
innate human sense of justice.”38 Thus it “provides an all-powerful
emotional support to the process of valuing and evaluating, and allows
human beings to overcome their most powerful natural instincts for the
sake of what they believe is right or just” both for themselves and for
others.39 However, the self-assertion engendered by the thymotic
desire for recognition is deeply paradoxical in that although thymos is
“the psychological seat of justice and selflessness,” it is also “closely
related to selfishness” because “[t]he thymotic self demands
recognition for its own sense of the worthiness of things, both itself
and of other people.”40 For this reason “[t]he desire for recognition
remains a form of self-assertion, a projection of one’s own values on
the outside world, and gives rise to feelings of anger when those
values are not recognized by other people.”41
Megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior to others.
It can manifest itself benignly as, for example, in the desire of the
36

37

38
39
40
41

The historical process at work here is very long-term, “measured in the
thousands of years since the first appearance of master-slave social relations
virtually up until the French Revolution.” F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 372
n.2. See also id. at 207 (referring to “an historical march of ten thousand years or
more”).
See id. at 133-35. Here Fukuyama refers to “discontinuities in history” as
including “the majority of man’s wars, the sudden eruptions of religious or
ideological or nationalist passion that lead to phenomena like Hitler and
Khomeini,” or again, “the wars and sudden eruptions of irrationality out of the
calm of economic development, that have characterized actual human history.”
Id.
Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 171-72.
Id. at 172.
Id. Fukuyama identifies the varied terminology that has been used to refer to the
same “psychological phenomenon” over the centuries, including thymos or
“spiritedness” (Plato), “man’s desire for glory” (Machiavelli), “his pride or
vainglory” (Hobbes), “his amour-propre” (Rousseau), “the love of fame”
(Alexander Hamilton), “ambition” (James Madison), “recognition” (Hegel), and
“man as the ‘beast with red cheeks’”(Nietzsche); id. at 162-63 (explaining that
“[a]ll of these terms refer to that part of man which feels the need to place value
on things—himself in the first instance, but on the people, actions, or things
around him as well”).
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concert pianist “to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of
Beethoven.”42 However, it also has a very problematic “dark side”
when it manifests as “the desire to dominate,” as in the case of the
master over the slave, the tyrant who invades and enslaves his
neighbors, or a power that engages in imperialism.43 Indeed, the “dark
side to the desire for recognition . . . has led many philosophers to
believe that thymos is the fundamental source of human evil.”44
The historical process has been driven forward by the
megalothymia of “masters,” and by the “struggle for recognition” on
the part of “slaves”45 to which this gives rise. At the beginning of
history society becomes divided into aristocratic masters and slaves as
the result of a “battle for pure prestige” in which “two primordial
combatants . . . seek to make the other ‘recognize’ their humanness by
staking their lives in a mortal battle.”46 And “[w]hen the natural fear of
death leads one combatant to submit, the relationship of master and
slave is born.”47 One could perhaps characterize this outcome as the
master sitting on a throne and the slave groveling at his feet.
By demonstrating that he can overcome his natural instincts in this
way, the master shows that he can exercise “free moral choice,” that is,
that he has “free will”; and this is the essence of man’s specific
dignity.48 However, the outcome of this battle for recognition is
unsatisfactory for both masters and slaves, because “[t]he slave, of
course, was not acknowledged as a human being in any way
whatsoever. But the recognition enjoyed by the master was deficient as
well, because he was not recognized by other masters, but slaves

42
43
44
45

46
47
48

Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Fukuyama clarifies that “[w]hen Kojève (or Hegel) refers to slaves, he is not
speaking narrowly of people with the legal status of chattel, but of all people
whose dignity is not ‘recognized,’ including, for example, the legally free
peasantry in pre-Revolutionary France.” Id. at 372 n.2.
Id. at xvi-xvii, 147-48.
Id.
Id. at 149-52. Like Kant and Hegel before him, Fukuyama is aware of the
argument that free will is a chimera because all human behavior is, in fact,
determined by physical or natural processes and forces. He side-steps this
“tortured question,” as we will, by treating the issue not as a metaphysical one
but as a psychological one: Thus, “[w]hether or not true free will exists, virtually
all human beings act as if it does.” Id. at 151-52.
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whose humanity was as yet incomplete.”49 This dissatisfaction or
“contradiction” drives history forward,50 specifically because slaves
took pride in their work, developed “something like a work ethic,”
invented science and technology, and conceptualized the “idea of
freedom” in the form of various philosophies or “slave ideologies.”51
Christianity has been the most consequential of these “slave
ideologies” because “[t]he Christian God recognizes all human beings
universally, recognizes their individual human worth and dignity”
based on the capacity of all men for moral choice and belief.52
However, because Christianity postponed the realization of human
freedom until the next life, completion of the historical process
required the secularization of Christianity through a philosophy, such
as Hegel’s own, that “translat[ed] . . . the Christian idea of freedom
into the here-and-now.”53 It also required “one more bloody battle, the
battle in which the slave liberates himself from the master,”54 This is
the historical role of the French and American Revolutions:
These democratic revolutions abolished the distinction
between master and slave by making the former slaves their
own masters and by establishing the principles of popular
sovereignty and the rule of law. The inherently unequal
recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal
and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognizes
the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where
that dignity is recognized in turn by the state through the
granting of rights.55

In sum, just as the combination of reason and desire in the first
mechanism leads to capitalism or economic liberalism, and
institutionalizes “rational desire” in the marketplace,56 so also the
combination of reason and thymos in the second mechanism leads to
political liberalism and democracy, and institutionalizes “rational

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at xvii.
Id. For further discussion of this point, see id. at 192-94.
Id. at 194-96.
Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198.
Id. at xvii-xviii.
Id. at 211-12, 337 (referring to “rational desire”).
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recognition” in “[t]he universal and homogenous state.”57 In this state
“the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous human being is
recognized by all”58 and “an all pervasive isothymia, that is, the desire
to be recognized as the equal of other people” has “ethically
vanquished” megalothymia.59 Thus “[t]he internal ‘contradiction’ of
the master-slave relationship was solved in a state which successfully
synthesized the morality of the master and the morality of the slave.”60
57

58
59

60

Id. at 204 (referring to “[t]he universal and homogenous state”), 200, 211-12,
337 (referring to “rational recognition”). For a more detailed description of the
“universal and homogenous state,” see id. at 200-04.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 190. One striking manifestation of this isothymia is the granting and
protection of individual rights as ends in themselves. Id. at xviii, 202-03.
Id. at 200-01, 203. The three parts of the soul or psyche—reason, thymos, and
desire—can perhaps be viewed as psychological functionalities that reflect
distinctive attributes of human biology and underpin various types of ethic. For
fascinating and suggestive discussion, see, e.g., Darcia Narvaez, Wisdom as
Mature Moral Functioning: Insights from Developmental Psychology and
Neurobiology, in T OWARD H UMAN F LOURISHING : C HARACTER , P RACTICAL
W ISDOM , AND P ROFESSIONAL F ORMATION 28-31 (Mark L. Jones, Paul A.
Lewis, & Kelly R. Reffitt, eds. 2013) and the further references therein
(describing three ethical orientations—the ethic of security, the ethic of
engagement, and the ethic of imagination—that are rooted in neurobiological
capacities and unconscious emotional systems shaped by experience)
[hereinafter Narvaez, Mature Moral Functioning]. See also Darcia Narvaez, The
Neurobiology of Moral Functioning and Moral Formation 1-8 [on file with
author] (same) [hereinafter Narvaez, Neurobiology]; K AREN A RMSTRONG ,
T WELVE S TEPS TO A C OMPASSIONATE L IFE 13-14, 17 (2010) (discussing our
“old brain” inherited from reptilian ancestors and predisposing to an interest in
“status, power, control, territory, sex, personal gain, and survival;” the
mammalian limbic system that generates “positive emotions of compassion, joy,
serenity, and maternal affection;” and our “‘new brain,’ the neocortex, home of
the reasoning powers that enable us to reflect on the world and on ourselves, and
to stand back from . . . instinctive, primitive passions”).
Expressions of thymos, especially of megalothymia, seem to be related to
our human tendency to form groups and to seek our identity through
membership in such groups. For an illuminating discussion of how our instinct
to form groups likely evolved through the natural selection of those groups
whose members practiced “reciprocal altruism,” is reinforced in larger groups
by organized religion’s creation of “moral communities” that establish trust
between strangers, and can easily and naturally lead to violence and war
between the in-group (Us) and rival out-groups (Them) in the competition for
scarce resources and for power, territory, and glory, see S ACKS , supra note 6, at
27-39 (2015). For Sacks, the source of much of the violence between groups, as
between individuals, is “mimetic desire” born of “sibling rivalry” in which one
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In other words, instead of a master sitting on a throne and the slave
groveling at his feet, each of them now sits in his own chair.
I’m sorry but I think I have been “lecturing” you. I do tend to get
carried away because I find all this so absorbing. I hope you don’t
mind.
Dirty Harry: Hey, I don’t have anything better to do. And some of
this stuff is really good. I mean—first, capitalism and “job creators.”
And now, aristocratic masters and megalothymia—sounds like just
what we need to deal with the punks. I particularly liked the way the
slaves submitted to save their lives in the bloody battle for pure
prestige—just like the punks who submitted to me outside the bank
and in the coffee shop. They understood who was in charge. And as
for those punks who didn’t, well, they’re dead.61 But, this really isn’t
helping me with my problem. I am not seeing a better way yet.
Professor Logie (concerned that Dirty Harry seems to be missing
the point and that he will have to be more explicit): Okay, well in that
case I think we need to talk more specifically about the problem of
violence. The Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, represented by Hobbes
and Locke, and the Continental European liberal tradition, represented
by Hegel-Kojève, agree that violence is a central problem, both among
the first men in the state of nature and in history, and that it originates
in what we have been calling the thymotic part of the soul. In their
various “experiments in thought” depicting the situation of the “first
men” in the state of nature,62 for example, Hegel-Kojève talk about the
bloody battle for pure prestige; Hobbes famously talks about the war
of “every man against every man” fueled by pride and vanity; and

61

62

sibling wants to have what the other sibling has or to be what the other sibling
is. Id. at 87-90. For further discussion, see infra notes 63, 102.
Cf. F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 147 (discussing three possible outcomes of
the primordial bloody battle for pure prestige: “the death of both combatants, . . .
the death of one of the contestants, . . . [o]r . . . the relationship of lordship and
bondage, in which one of the contestants decides to submit to a life of slavery
rather than face the risk of violent death”).
Id. at 146 (claiming that Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel all undertook “a
kind of experiment in thought” portraying “the First Man, that is, man in the
‘state of nature,’” even though Hegel resisted such terminology himself, their
goal being “to strip away those aspects of the human personality that were
simply the product of convention . . . and to uncover those characteristics that
were common to man as man” and thus “that existed prior to the creation of civil
society and the historical process”). However, in contrast to Hobbes, for
example, Hegel intended his account to depict an actual historical stage. Id. at
365 n.2.

2016

Beyond Punks in Empty Chairs

331

Locke also agrees that the state of nature potentially degenerates into
war or anarchy.63 Moreover, both traditions converge on liberal
democracy as the solution. However, they get there in very different
ways.
As we have seen, Hegel-Kojève accept the necessity and indeed
the value of thymos and the struggle for recognition. By contrast, for
Hobbes and Locke, thymos and the “prideful quest for recognition”
must be suppressed, or at least strongly subordinated, to the desire for
self-preservation (Hobbes) or to the desire for self-preservation and
material comfort (Locke).64 Thus the first men in the state of nature set
up a government to maintain social peace and achieve these purposes,
through a social contract founded upon “enlightened self-interest—
desire combined with reason.”65 This also means, of course, that
although the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition helps to explain why
human beings would favor economic liberalism, or capitalism, it
63

64
65

Id. at 146-52 (Hegel), 154-56 (Hobbes), 158 (Locke). According to Rabbi
Jonathan Sacks, our natural tendency towards group identity and resulting
violence and war between rival groups, supra note 60, can take a “mutant form,
pathological dualism, that divides the world into two—our side, the children of
light, and the other side, the children of darkness.” S ACKS , supra note 6, at 10002. This simplistic division of humanity into good versus evil is rooted in the
tendency to reduce complexity through dualism and the need to forestall
potential violence within the group by projecting it onto outsiders as scapegoat
(as, for example, in anti-Semitism), and produces a “threefold defeat of
morality” whereby people dehumanize and demonize their enemies (which
destroys empathy and sympathy), see themselves as victims (which deflects
moral responsibility by blaming outsiders), and commit “altruistic evil” (which
“turns ordinary human beings into murderers in the name of high ideals,”
especially religious ideals, that is, in the name of an “altruistic cause”). Id. at 4486. These processes of pathological dualism “activate the most primitive part of
the brain . . . with its instant and overwhelming defensive reactions . . . that,
under stress . . . can entirely overwhelm the slower-moving prefrontal cortex.”
Id. at 56, 86.
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at xviii, 156-59, 184-85.
Id. at xviii, 156-60, 184-85, 200, 203 (explicating the differences in the terms of
the respective social contracts—the absolute government of Hobbes and the
limited government and majority rule of Locke—and observing that government
protects individual rights not so much as “ends in themselves” providing
recognition but “to a large extent . . . as a means of preserving a private sphere
where men can enrich themselves and satisfy the desiring parts of their souls”).
The typical result, then, is “a new type” of human being, the bourgeois private
individual, who is selfishly concerned with his own self-preservation and
material well-being and is “neither public-spirited, nor virtuous, nor dedicated to
the larger community.” Id. at 145, 160, 185.
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cannot in fact adequately explain why human beings favor political
liberalism and democracy, even though it champions these things as
well. The reason, it bears repeating, is because “the striving for liberal
democracy . . . ultimately arises out of thymos, the part of the soul that
demands recognition.”66
Consequently, a full account of liberal democracy, and of the
relatively peaceful situation of the “last men” who inhabit liberal
democracies, requires the integration of both traditions, and in fact this
is what has occurred. Thus, “while the Anglo-Saxon democracies may
have been founded on explicitly Lockean grounds, their selfunderstanding has never been purely Lockean.”67 As a result, “[w]hen
people in contemporary America talk about their society and form of
government, they frequently use language that is more Hegelian than
Lockean,”68 as emphasis upon the concept of “human dignity” in the
language of the civil rights movement clearly attests.69
By integrating the two traditions, then, we can understand more
readily why the particular economic and political arrangements of
liberal democracy optimally satisfy all three parts of the soul.70 In turn,
this means that we can also more readily understand why these
arrangements conduce to social peace and why there is such emphasis
upon compassion and “a steadily decreasing tolerance for violence,
death, and suffering.”71 Similarly, these arrangements also conduce to
international peace. Thus, with the demotion of aristocratic masters
and with the gains from economic development, liberal democracies—
or perhaps one should rather say, mature liberal democracies—are not
66

67
68
69

70
71

Id. at xviii, 159-61, 199-200. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text
(noting that “Man is more than ‘Economic Man;’ he is also ‘thymotic man’”).
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 203.
Id.
Id. at 203-04. For perhaps two of the most striking recent examples at the time
of latest writing (July 2015), see e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (ruling Article 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
containing at least ten explicit references to human dignity and several
additional allusions to such dignity in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (ruling that the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires recognition of the validity of
same-sex marriages and containing at least eleven explicit references to human
dignity and, again, several additional allusions to such dignity in Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion).
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 136, 200, 206, 337.
See id. at 259-61.
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interested in megalothymotic, imperialistic attempts to dominate other
countries militarily; and they especially have no interest in dominating
one another in this way, as is evidenced by the fact that “there have
been few, if any, instances of one liberal democracy going to war with
another.”72
So, there you have it, as they say—one very important way to
reduce violence and conflict both within and between societies is for
them to become liberal democracies. I wonder if my friends have
anything to add to what I have said.
Professor Roe: I really like the arguments in favor of liberal
democracy as the best way to organize society. But, speaking as an
historian, your historical account seems highly general and abstract.
So, I wonder just how accurate and balanced it can be. I suspect the
devil is in the details.
Professor Logie: Well, you are right that such a Universal History
omits a great deal. But it does so in order that we will not fail to see
the wood for the trees. Instead, it tries to reveal the rational pattern in
events and the general direction in which humanity is moving. I should
also mention that Fukuyama’s more recent work does explore the
historical details in considerable depth, examining what specifically is
required for societies to be able to attain liberal democracy (namely,
functioning states, the rule of law, and accountable government) and
the concrete obstacles that must be overcome to achieve it.73 However,
despite the existence of such obstacles, Fukuyama does not seem to
have abandoned the historical determinism that underpins The End of
History and the Last Man.74 It should be remembered, too, that this
72

73

74

Id. at xx, 260-65, 271-72. Of course, liberal democracies may still fight
defensive wars with states that are not liberal democracies. Id. at 263, 267. On
the nationalist excesses of immature liberal democracies, see infra note 102.
See generally F RANCIS F UKUYAMA , T HE O RIGINS OF P OLITICAL O RDER :
F ROM P REHUMAN T IMES TO THE F RENCH R EVOLUTION (2011); F RANCIS
F UKUYAMA , P OLITICAL O RDER AND P OLITICAL D ECAY : F ROM THE
I NDUSTRIAL R EVOLUTION TO THE G LOBALIZATION OF D EMOCRACY (2014).
See Francis Fukuyama, At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy, W ALL
S T . J. (June 6, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-stillstands-democracy-1402080661 (“In the realm of ideas . . . liberal democracy
still doesn’t have any real competitors. . . Even as we raise questions about how
soon everyone will get there, we should have no doubt as to what kind of society
lies at the end of History.”); see also, e.g., Ian Morris, How to Get to the End of
History, S LATE (May 2, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/
2011/05/how_to_get_to_the_end_of_history.html; Glen Austin Sproviero,
Beyond the End of History: Fukuyama’s Myopic Vision, T HE U. B OOKMAN
(Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.kirkcenter.org/index.php/bookman/article/beyond-
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earlier book has more of the character of political philosophy, whereas
the recent books are more political history and political science.
Professor Hope: I would like to ask about something you said
towards the end. You suggested that because liberal democracy
optimally satisfies all three parts of the soul we can more readily
understand why it conduces to social peace. This reminded me of the
expression “No peace without justice.”
Professor Logie: Now that is very interesting. I like where I think
you’re going with it, but perhaps you can explain more exactly where
you see the connection between justice and peace with regard to the
soul so I can be sure.
Professor Hope: Well, it seems that the historical process you
describe can be regarded as a search for justice and the overcoming of
various types of injustice. But whatever specific issues may have been
the focus of particular claims for justice during the historical process,
those claims have also necessarily involved the thymotic part of the
soul and the struggle to tame the megalothymia of aristocratic societies
and transform it into the isothymia of liberal democracies. Couldn’t
one say, therefore, that this transformation of megalothymia into
isothymia represents a rebalancing and more just redistribution of
thymotic value or thymotic energy between the souls of masters and
slaves—which one can picture, as you have done, by each citizen now
sitting in his or her own chair instead of the master sitting on the
throne and the slave groveling at his feet—resulting in greater
harmony, or peace, between their souls? And by the same token,
doesn’t that redistribution also produce a rebalancing and more just
distribution of thymotic energy within each of their souls, resulting in
greater harmony, or peace, within those souls? Indeed, doesn’t Plato
himself regard justice within the soul as being a condition in which all
the parts of the soul are in harmony or proper balance? And couldn’t
this achievement of peace as a result of a more just distribution of
thymos between and within souls be described as achieving peace
through a type of “spiritual” or psychic justice? Moreover, isn’t there
an important link between such internal “spiritual” justice and external
acts of justice, so that the more of the former there is, the more of the
the-end-of-history-fukuyamas-myopic-vision/; Glenn C. Altschuler, ‘Political
Order and Political Decay’ by Francis Fukuyama: review, SF GATE (Oct. 29,
2014), http://www.sfgate.com/books/article/Political-Order-and-PoliticalDecay-by-5856742.php (book reviews).
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latter there is likely to be too—and indeed vice-versa, at least over
time once resentments on the part of those who lost have diminished?
Professor Logie: This is where I thought you were going. Those
are excellent thoughts. And you are absolutely right about Plato, of
course. Interestingly, at the very end of his book, Fukuyama does seem
to connect his thesis to the idea of justice in the soul when he says that
for Plato “[t]he just city was one in which all three parts of the soul
were satisfied and brought into balance under the guidance of reason,”
and “it would seem that liberal democracy gives fullest scope to all
three parts. If it would not qualify as the most just regime ‘in speech,’
it might serve as the most just regime ‘in reality.’”75 Thus, specifically
with regard to thymos, for example, he observes that not only is thymos
present in the form of isothymia, but all healthy and stable liberal
democracies “must permit some degree of safe and domesticated
megalothymia, even if this runs contrary to the principles they profess
to believe in.”76 It is simply natural for some people to want to excel
and be recognized as superior to others rather than just being one of a
mass of “last men” engaging in “rational consumption.”77 And indeed
liberal democracies provide several outlets for megalothymia—
business, science and technology, politics (especially foreign policy),
sports, artistic culture, and so on.78 In this way, then, each of the
human types receives what is “spiritually due” to it, and the various
parts of the soul within each of those types receive what is “spiritually
due” to them. However, Fukuyama does not then explicitly make the
additional connection between this idea of “spiritual justice”—of
justice in the soul—and the idea of peace as you have done, although
surely he would not disagree with putting the matter that way.
Father Pope, do you have any comments about what I have said?
And then I would be really quite interested to know what you think
about it all, Inspector Callahan.
75
76
77

78

F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 337.
Id. For further discussion of this point, see id. at 315, 320-21.
Id. at 313-15. For an extended discussion of Nietzsche’s critique of liberal
democracy as representing not “a synthesis of the morality of the master and the
morality of the slave” but “an unconditional victory of the slave” resulting in a
society of “last men” who are “without [c]hests” and “[without] a certain
horizon, that is, a set of values and beliefs that are accepted absolutely and
uncritically” within which they can live, see id. at 300-12.
Id. at 315-21. See also id. at 223-34 (discussing the thymotic origins of work
and the work ethic, including standards of professionalism, and the thymotic
elements in economic liberalism).
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II. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: SITTING APART
AND “PUNKIFYING” OTHERS
Father Pope: I must confess to wondering about the notion that
the economic and political arrangements of liberal democracy, as you
have described them, are completely satisfying to human beings.
Professor Logie: Well, Fukuyama does ask whether there might
be some remaining “contradictions” in liberal democracy that make it
less than completely satisfying to human beings. Here he considers
challenges from both the “Left” and the “Right” that essentially center
on the tension between liberty and equality. The challenge from the
Left is that “the promise of universal, reciprocal recognition remains
essentially unfulfilled.”79 Using our metaphor of the chairs, I suppose
one could say that this challenge focuses on differences between
everyone’s chairs—differences in their height, size, appearance, and
comfort—and tries to reduce or eliminate those differences. The more
serious challenge, for Fukuyama, comes from the Right, which rejects
“the goal of equal recognition itself . . . because human beings are
inherently unequal.”80 I suppose one could say here, then, that some
individuals might again seek a throne, with everyone else dispossessed
of their own chairs and groveling at their feet. However, in the final
analysis, Fukuyama does not seem overly concerned that either type of
challenge could defeat the idea of liberal democracy, provided we
remain clear about what is really at stake.81 But I get the sense that you
were thinking of something else.
Father Pope: That’s right. It seems that Fukuyama is basically
providing a secular justification for liberal democracy. Even assuming
his teleology is not flawed because God does not intervene in history
to influence such matters, I question whether secular liberal democracy
alone can be completely satisfying to human beings. So, I think HegelKojève may be onto something very important when they say that
“[t]he Christian God recognizes all human beings universally,
recognizes their individual human worth and dignity,” although, at
least as you have described it, they then seem to dismiss Christianity,
and religion generally, too easily.82 Of course, it may seem paradoxical
to talk about “recognition” by God, since recognition is associated
79
80
81
82

Id. at 289.
Id.
Id. at 314-15, 336-38.
Supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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with pride, which is regarded as a sin. However—and without trying to
solve the knotty problem of the relationship of the psyche to the
immortal soul83—perhaps it is not so paradoxical on a proper
understanding of Christian humility, and of the difference between
unhealthy pride and a healthy sense of self-worth that comes from
knowing one is valued and loved by God. Thus, there may still be a
place for a healthy form of thymos in the divine economy. Perhaps we
should think of it as thymos undergoing a type of transformation in
which we acknowledge that we have received the world, ourselves,
and one another, as Gift that is entrusted to us as stewards.84 I may
want to revisit all this later if there is an opportunity. For now, let me
just say that it is a great blessing that we live in a system that respects
and protects religious freedom.
Professor Hope: So, at least in that formal sense, Father, I suppose
you could say that liberal democracy might be completely satisfying to
human beings, because it does allow their “restless hearts” to seek God
in their own way.85
Father Pope: In that formal sense, yes, I agree with you.
Professor Logie: And now, Inspector Callahan—finally—what do
you think about all this? Doesn’t living in a liberal democracy, and
83

84

85

Here, Father Pope acknowledges that when we speak about the tripartite soul or
“spiritual justice,” we are basically talking about the human psyche, and about
psychological conflict and well-being and its relationship to economic and
political arrangements, and not necessarily about the immortal soul of
Christianity. For the Roman Catholic teaching on the soul, see C ATECHISM OF
THE C ATHOLIC C HURCH §§ 362-368 (1994, 1997) [hereinafter CATECHISM].
Cf. 1 Peter 4:10 (New Am. Rev. ed. 2011) (“As each one has received a gift, use
it to serve one another as good stewards of God’s varied grace.”).
Here Professor Hope has in mind the beginning of Saint Augustine’s
Confessions:
“Great art thou, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is thy
power, and infinite is thy wisdom.” And man desires to praise
thee, for he is a part of thy creation; he bears his mortality
about with him and carries the evidence of his sin and the
proof that thou dost resist the proud. Still he desires to praise
thee, this man who is only a small part of thy creation. Thou
hast prompted him, that he should delight to praise thee, for
thou hast made us for thyself and restless is our heart until it
comes to rest in thee.
T HE C ONFESSIONS OF S AINT A UGUSTINE Book One, 1.1 (Albert C.
Outler, trans., 1955) (referencing Ps. 145:3, Ps. 147:5), http://www9.
georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/ augustine/conf.pdf (emphasis added). For further
discussion on religion’s place in liberal democracies, see infra note 99.

338

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 312

encouraging its spread around the globe, offer a “better way to a better
world,” as you put it—one with much less conflict and violence—for
the reasons we have explored?86
Dirty Harry: Is that it? That’s your big point? You people really
crack me up. I’ve been listening to you yakking away about your
grand theories—yak, yak, and more yak. I’m beginning to understand
why they say that academics live in an “ivory tower.” You sure as hell
don’t live in the real world, my world, Sorry about the language,
Father; and I don’t mean you so much anyway because you haven’t
bought into all this crap uncritically; sorry again.
But in case you other pointy heads hadn’t noticed, we do live in a
liberal democracy; and there are a lot of problems. The place is full of
punks: criminals I have to deal with every day; other losers who
haven’t done an honest day’s work in their lives but just want a
handout; unions demanding higher wages and extorting employers, the
job creators; millions of illegal aliens; “victims” who keep squealing
for new “rights”; baby killers. And that’s just us. What about the rest
of the world? What about those countries that aren’t liberal
democracies? They’re killing each other—Syria anyone? Egypt?
Yemen? And they’re attacking us as well, like those crazy Muslim
terrorists did on 9/11/01, or when they stormed our embassies and
consulates over some stupid movie exactly eleven years later, or when
they bombed the Boston Marathon in April 2013. Now we’ve got the
86

Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis has been subjected to various critiques,
including Samuel Huntington’s notorious “clash of civilizations” counter-thesis
(stressing especially the clash between Muslims and non-Muslims). See
S AMUEL P. H UNTINGTON , T HE C LASH OF C IVILIZATIONS AND THE
R EMAKING OF W ORLD O RDER (1996). Although detailed discussion of these
critiques is beyond the scope of this Article, it should perhaps be noted that
many of the critics seem to have misunderstood the nuances of Fukuyama’s
argument and/or to be impatient in failing to take the very long-term view. As
discussed supra note 74 and accompanying text, Fukuyama still seems to adhere
to his “end of history” thesis despite the dramatic events that have occurred
during the quarter century since he first articulated it. Fukuyama himself now
sees the greatest danger to the future of liberal democracy in biotechnological
advances that might make it possible for humans to control their own evolution
and thus alter what it means to be a human being. See F RANCIS F UKUYAMA ,
O UR P OSTHUMAN F UTURE : C ONSEQUENCES OF THE B IOTECHNOLOGY
R EVOLUTION (2002). Although an architect of neoconservatism, and at one time
a supporter of the Bush Administration’s neoconservative agenda, Fukuyama
subsequently distanced himself from that agenda. See Francis Fukuyama, After
Neoconservatism, N.Y. T IMES M AG ., (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html?ex&_r=0.
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ISIS crazies too. And then, even though liberal democracies may not
fight one another, we have to go and sort them out. Iraq anyone?
Afghanistan? Not to mention the Democrats and other liberal types
like you, who go all weak at the knees and fall over themselves to
molly coddle all of them. What a bunch of punks!
So I see lots of problems, lots of conflicts and divisions, and lots of
punks. So what’s all this “Kumbaya” peace and harmony, spiritual
justice, and God knows what else, at the “end of history” crap? Give
me a break.
Professor Logie (somewhat taken aback at the forcefulness and
passion of Dirty Harry’s response and not quite sure whether he has
just been called a punk): Well, there’s definitely a lot there, and I’m
sorry you’re upset that we haven’t been much help. Fukuyama is
certainly aware of the problems, conflicts, and divisions you mention,
and he tries to give us a way to think about them within the framework
of his general thesis.
With regard to liberal democracies themselves, in addition to
acknowledging the many social problems that exist, including crime,87
Fukuyama wants us to understand how the kinds of conflicts and
divisions you mention are often (not always, to be sure) thymotic
conflicts involving the desire for recognition, in addition to being, or
sometimes even instead of being, a clash of economic interests
implicating the desiring part of the soul.88 Thus, thymos may operate
autonomously or as “an ally of desire,”89 depending on the type of
claim and conflict involved. He says, for example, that “[v]irtually the
entire civil liberties and civil rights agendas, while having certain
economic components, are essentially thymotic contests over
recognition of competing understandings of justice and human
dignity.”90

87

88

89
90

See F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 288 (“Liberal democracies are doubtless
plagued by a host of problems like unemployment, pollution, drugs, crime, and
the like”).
For examples, see id. at 171-72 (feminism and racism), 172-74 (wage claims
and economic justice), 176 (abortion, racism, poverty, and civil liberties and
civil rights generally), 187 (abortion rights, school prayer, freedom of speech),
190 (anti-abortion protests, animal rights advocacy), 203-04 (civil rights, right to
vote), and 277-78 (immigration). See also supra note 79 and accompanying text
(discussing the challenge to liberal democracy from the “Left”).
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 177.
Id. at 176.
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Thymos is involved in so much human conflict because “[i]n a
world of thymotic moral selves, they will be constantly disagreeing
and arguing and growing angry with one another over a host of
questions, large and small.”91 This means that the “factions” that
concerned Founders such as Madison “result not just from the clash
between the desiring parts of different men’s souls (i.e., economic
interests) but between their thymotic parts as well.”92 We could say,
therefore, that these kinds of thymotic conflicts are present-day
instances of the continuing “struggle for recognition” within liberal
democracies themselves.93
Also, if I may say so, your examples of thymotic conflict between
the citizens of liberal democracies seem a little tendentious and onesided. They imply that the sources of conflict are provocations from
the “Left.” Wouldn’t it be more balanced to acknowledge that “it takes
two to tango” and that many of these conflicts are provoked, or also
provoked, by over-reaching megalothymia on the “Right”—often
combined with excessive desire, that is, greed? For example, what
about the “masters of the universe” who played such a significant part
in the global financial meltdown from which we are still recovering,94
or business owners who exploit their workers or are reckless about the
safety of their products or about the harm to our environment caused
by their hubris, or politicians who mislead us into futile foreign wars
by their hubris, or mysogynistic or homophobic religious fanatics who
try to force their oppressive morality on women or gays? What about
our growing police state? Not to mention the heartless Republicans
and Ayn Rand types who don’t seem to care about anyone else.

91
92
93

94

Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 187. For further discussion of the Founders, see id. at 203-04.
Of course, the health, and perhaps even the very survival, of liberal democracies
depend on their citizens’ “irrational recognition” in some important respects. See
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (virtues); F UKUYAMA , supra note 11,
at 218-19, 222 (civil associations and communities), 229-34 (work ethic and its
supporting communities), 215, 219, 222 (pride in liberal democracy); see also
supra note 78 and accompanying text (outlets for megalothymia). For my own
attempt to use ideas derived from the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre to suggest
a link between the health of modern liberal democracies and the pursuit of
excellence and virtue in communities of professional practice, see Mark L.
Jones, Fisherman Jack: Living in “Juropolis”—The Fishing Village of the Law,
66 M ERCER L. R EV . 485 (2015).
See generally S ATYAJIT D AS , E XTREME M ONEY : M ASTERS OF THE U NIVERSE
AND THE C ULT OF R ISK (2011).
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I’m sorry; now I really am getting my knickers in a tangle. It seems
like our thymos is definitely showing, doesn’t it?95 I need to regain my
philosophical composure. (Professor Logie takes a deep breath). Of
course, these kinds of political disputes and social divisions in stable
liberal democracies rarely generate large-scale physical violence. By
contrast, in those societies which are not yet stable liberal
democracies, that is, that are not yet part of the “post-historical world,”
but are still “stuck in history,” as Fukuyama puts it,96 often such
conflicts do result in large-scale violence—and many tragic deaths—as
these societies tear themselves apart, or fight with one another, or do
both simultaneously; and liberal democracies may be dragged into the
conflicts too. The reasons are varied but two of the major ones are
religion and nationalism, both of which are manifestations of the
culture of a people97 and involve “irrational” forms of thymos and
“irrational recognition.”98 Although neither one of these factors is
“inherently incompatible” with liberal democracy and international
peace, because both can be “defanged” and become tolerant,99 each is
95

96
97
98

99

Dirty Harry and Professor Logie’s use of stereotyping and highly derogatory
language in characterizing those groups they find distasteful is symptomatic of
the apparent deterioration in the quality of our political conversation in the
United States in recent years and of the deep political, economic, and religious
divisions that are reflected in this deteriorated conversation. See Citizenship and
Civility in a Divided Democracy: Political, Religious, and Legal Concerns—A
Symposium of the Mercer Law Review, 63 M ERCER L. R EV . 793 (2012)
(providing one example, among many, of an effort to address this problem).
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 276-77.
Id. at 212-14.
Id. at xix, 207, 234, 266. For Fukuyama’s discussion of several “cultural”
factors that can impede the transition to liberal democracy, see id. at 212-19; see
also Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 F OREIGN A FF . 22
(1997) (exploring the distinctions between liberalism and democracy); Robert
Cooper, Why We Still Need Empires, O BSERVER (April 7, 2002),
http://www.theguardian.com/observer/worldview/story/0,11581,680117,00.html
(calling for a new “postmodern imperialism” in a world made up of postmodern
states, modern states, and pre-modern states). On the provocative question
regarding the extent to which the United States is (not yet) part of the “posthistorical” world, see Francis Fukuyama, The History at the End of History,
G UARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/
apr/03/thehistoryattheendofhist.
See F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 216, 270-71 (religion), 215, 268-75
(nationalism). For the argument that liberal democracy, with its freedom of
conscience, pluralistic toleration of a diversity of beliefs, and separation of
religion and political power, is the best political arrangement for “defanging”
religion, see S ACKS , supra note 6, at 228-30; see also J OHN M ICKLETHWAIT &
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also viciously capable of revealing the “dark side” of thymos.100 In
Fukuyama’s sobering words “[o]nly thymos, searching for ‘justice,’ is
capable of true fanaticism, obsession, and hatred.”101 We see the
potential in the Islamic world today.102

100

101
102

A DRIAN W OOLDRIDGE , G OD IS B ACK : H OW THE G LOBAL R EVIVAL OF F AITH
IS C HANGING THE W ORLD 367-73 (2009) (extolling the American “solution”
embodied in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Given the current
conditions in today’s world, however, Sacks considers that it is now imperative
to grapple with the theology that led to religious conflicts in the first place:
As Jews, Christians, and Muslims, we have to be prepared to ask
the most uncomfortable questions. Does the God of Abraham want
his disciples to kill for his sake? Does he demand human sacrifice?
Does he rejoice in holy war? Does he want us to hate our enemies
and terrorize unbelievers? Have we read our sacred texts correctly?
What is God saying to us, here, now?
S ACKS , supra note 6, at 19-23.
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 181-82, 201, 214, 255-56, 259, 266-68
(discussing the replacement of dynastic and religious imperialism by
nationalistic imperialism).
Id. at 214.
For Europe’s own historical excesses, see id. at 259-60, 271 (religion), 266-68,
330-32 (nationalism); see also id. at 268-75 (potential for renewed nationalist
excesses in Europe and elsewhere). For an overview of religiously motivated
violence and “altruistic evil” in our own time and possible responses, see
S ACKS , supra note 6, at 3-26. For further extended discussion of the challenges
posed by antagonisms and conflicts rooted in religion in our own time (including
both literal wars and culture wars) and various responses, see generally
M ICKLETHWAIT & W OOLDRIDGE , supra note 99, at 297-367. Sacks considers
that pathological dualism and violence have marked the relationship of the three
Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) for so much of their
history because “[b]uilt into their self-definitions are a series of sibling rivalries
drawn from the early narratives of the Hebrew Bible” that are “fraught with
mimetic desire . . . for the same thing, Abraham’s promise [and] the most
precious gift of all: God’s paternal love.” S ACKS , supra note 6, at 98-102. For
Sacks’ elaboration of these self-definitions, see id. at 90-98. For earlier
discussion of sibling rivalry and pathological dualism, see supra notes 60, 63
respectively.
Sacks offers a radical re-reading of the relevant narratives from Genesis
(Cain and Abel, Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, Joseph and his brothers,
Rachel and Leah), identifying counter-narratives that reject the various elements
of pathological dualism and progressively overcome sibling rivalry, culminating
in reconciliation among siblings and their realization that mimetic desire is
misconceived because they each have their own blessing and are loved by God
for what and who they are. S ACKS , supra note 6, at 102-73. For Sacks’
discussion of what else is needed, in addition to such re-interpretation, for Jews,
Christians, and Muslims (and also different groupings within each faith) to live
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Dirty Harry: Like I said, there are punks everywhere—in liberal
democracies and in other countries—and it seems you agree with me.
And the only way I know to deal with punks is to use force and
violence, physical or otherwise. So, I still don’t see a better way—even
after all your yakking. Do you always talk so much and say so little?
III. UNDERSTANDING ONE ANOTHER: SITTING TOGETHER
“RECOGNIZING” OTHERS—SPIRITUAL JUSTICE PART TWO

AND

Professor Hope: May I make a suggestion based on something we
have already talked about. I wonder if the problem is that you are too
easily labeling those you regard as antagonists as just “punks.” Before
you conclude that they are punks, shouldn’t you at least listen to them,
and try to hear what they are saying or asking for? Instead of—or at
least before—you “rope an’ throw an’ brand ‘em,” as one might say,
shouldn’t you “try to understand ‘em”? (Dirty Harry smiles on being
reminded of one of his favorite T.V. shows from his youth:
“Rawhide”103). In other words, shouldn’t understanding precede
judgment and any decision or any action flowing from it?
Aren’t we all familiar with the experience that listening to
someone, and being listened to, can help defuse conflict? After all—

103

together in peace, and of how these additional elements also find warrant in
interpretations of the Hebrew Bible, see id. at 177-88 (loving the stranger
through a role reversal that imagines oneself as, and puts oneself in the place of,
the Other), 189-206 (honoring human commonalities by honoring the dignity of
every Other as the image and likeness of God, as well as human diversity by
honoring differences among persons and cultures and accepting that their
relationship with God may be different from one’s own), 207-19 (rejecting
fundamentalism and re-interpreting “hard texts” in love in the direction of
spiritual maximalism and military minimalism in accordance with traditional
rules of interpretation and structures of authority), 220-37 (relinquishing
political power and the imposition of religious truth by force, especially through
“apocalyptic politics,” relying instead on exerting influence through strength of
argument and example, preferably in liberal democracy that makes space for
difference), 238-51 (letting go of blame, hate, and the desire for revenge, instead
achieving freedom by forgiving past wrongs and taking responsibility for
building a better future), 252-67 (fostering cooperation among Jews, Christians,
and Muslims to recover, defend, and implement the humanizing values of
Abrahamic monotheism, to apply the principle of reciprocal altruism in their
mutual relations, and to reject the altruistic evil of terrorism).
See Frankie Laine—Rawhide Lyrics, COWBOYLYRICS.COM, http://www.
cowboylyrics.com/lyrics/laine-frankie/rawhide-12547.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2016) (lyrics to theme song); Frankie Laine, Rawhide, YOUTUBE (July 10,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5upqYOuH0jQ (theme song).
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actually, I don’t know about you, I suppose, and maybe you’re
different—but speaking for myself anyway: When I am in an
argument, if I feel I am really being listened to and taken seriously,
and that I am being valued and respected at least in this regard, then I
begin to feel less angry. But the opposite is true if I feel I am not being
listened to and taken seriously; then I become more frustrated and
indignant because I feel disrespected. I bet that anyone who is married
or in another type of close relationship knows exactly what I mean.
And if I and the other person both feel that we are listening to and
taking one other seriously, doesn’t that in turn make our underlying
conflict easier to deal with as well? Isn’t it then easier to find a
mutually acceptable solution, or at least to agree to disagree on a more
amicable basis?
Well, if this is true—and accepting, for the sake of argument, that
it is—what is going on here psychologically? Don’t our feelings of
frustration, humiliation, and resentment, when we feel disvalued and
treated dismissively, and of support, self-worth, and goodwill, when
we feel valued and taken seriously, have their seat in the thymotic part
of the soul? Moreover, isn’t taking another person seriously by truly
listening to them another way to recognize that person? Indeed, don’t
our “struggles for recognition” involve, at least initially, the struggle to
be heard and to be understood? First, we struggle to have our claims
heard and understood, to be “recognized” in this procedural sense;
then we continue to struggle to persuade others that our claims should
be accepted on the merits, and thus “recognized” in this second,
substantive sense.
And, going back to what we were discussing earlier about
justice104: If we are truly heard and understood—if we are
“recognized” in the first, procedural sense—isn’t that another
important aspect of justice? Isn’t it part of giving someone their “due,”
not just that they have a chair to sit in and from which they can speak
in the conversation but that they are given a proper hearing by others
sitting in their own chairs? By contrast, isn’t a refusal to listen and to
try to understand another’s point of view a refusal to “recognize” them
and a denial of justice by not giving them their “due”? Isn’t it, in fact,
a type of megalothymia, an assertion of superiority, to say in effect:
“Why should I listen to you; you are just a “fill in the blank (inferior
lazy Black person, Muslim, benighted religious bigot)” whereas I am a
“fill in the blank (superior hard-working White person, Christian,
104

See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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member of the enlightened intelligentsia)”? But if, instead, I am able
to overcome my irrational pride and say, with humility: “You are
worthy of being listened to,” then isn’t this an additional
acknowledgement of isothymia? And doesn’t this type of “procedural
justice” therefore also represent, and indeed bring about, a
redistribution of thymotic value from me to you? Consequently isn’t
this yet another way in which we can achieve “spiritual justice”
between, and within, our two souls? And doesn’t this help to explain
why, when we do this to and for each other, we have the more
positive—or, one could say, more “peaceful” or harmonious—feelings
we just talked about? And why, when we do not do this to and for each
other, the opposite is true and we have the negative, more “hostile” or
disharmonious feelings instead? In other words, isn’t this another
important aspect of “No peace without justice”?
Moreover, isn’t this part of the genius behind the Rule of Law?
Don’t we help to defuse anger and disarm conflict that might
otherwise result in violence by giving people their “day in court” when
they can be assured of being heard in accordance with the rituals and
forms of the law? So, in the Anglo-American legal tradition we say
that hearing the other side (audi alteram partem) is part of “natural
justice.”105 But, of course, when the judge does “procedural justice” by
listening to and trying to understand each side of the case in the legal
conversation, it does not guarantee, during the continuing struggle by
the parties to have their claims accepted, that there will in fact be a just
outcome on the merits. Similarly, when we do “procedural justice” by
listening to and trying to understand one another in our particular
conversations, whatever they may be (political, religious, personal, and
so forth), it also does not guarantee, during the continuing struggle to
have our claims accepted, that the outcome will be just. However, just
as in the law, doesn’t such listening and understanding make it much
more likely both that the outcome is in fact a just one and, perhaps
even more important, that we will both agree that it is just—that our
respective chairs are of appropriate relative height, size, appearance,
and comfort?106 Furthermore, if the outcome is indeed just and agreed
105

106

Audi Alteram Partem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ONLINE, (2d ed. 1910),
http://thelawdictionary.org/audi-alteram-partem/; H.L.A. H ART , T HE C ONCEPT
OF L AW 160 (3d ed. 2012) (part of principles of Natural Justice).
On “justice” in the law, see A NTHONY T. K RONMAN , T HE L OST L AWYER :
F AILING I DEALS OF THE L EGAL P ROFESSION 335 (1993) (“Doing justice to the
parties that appear before one means honoring the rights and enforcing the duties
that the law assigns them.”). On agreement that the outcome is a just one, see id.
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to be so, so that each receives and is acknowledged to have received
their “due” on the merits, then won’t this achieve even more
“spiritual” justice and peace between and within our souls? But my
main focus here is on the importance of doing justice by listening and
trying to understand.
Dirty Harry: Great: more crap about “spiritual justice” He talks a
lot (gesturing towards Professor Logie), and you ask a lot of
questions, and neither of you seems to have a clue. So, tell me—just
exactly why should I waste my time “doing justice” to punks by
listening to them and trying to understand them? I don’t need to listen
to them; I already know they’re punks. “Spiritual justice” for punks!
Whatever next? Oh yeah, I know—let’s give the criminal punks lots of
rights and protections under your precious “Rule of Law” and no
rights and protections to the victims. By the way, that’s where I come
in; I give them “justice” alright—I give ‘em a .44 Magnum. Now
that’s justice. Oh, and in case you’re wondering about it, no, I don’t
feel any great need to get “spiritual justice” and “peace” in my own
“soul” because some other kind of punk I disagree with has
“recognized” me by listening to me and trying to understand me.
Professor Hope: Putting the criminal justice system aside—
although I do think it might be interesting to know just exactly how
people come to be criminals in the first place—you continue to resist
the idea that you should first try to listen and understand someone you
disagree with, because otherwise you are pre-judging, or judging
without understanding. You continue to assume that the other person is
just a “punk.” I could, of course, suggest that you might appear to be
just a punk to that other person as well, but that probably wouldn’t get
us very far. Let’s see if there is a way for you to see things differently,
to see that once you have listened and tried to understand, then the
other person really might not seem to be such a punk after all. Perhaps
an example or a little exercise might help get us started. And, since we
have already mentioned the law—Professor Roe would you tell
Inspector Callahan about the animal trials you talked about at the
conference today.
Professor Roe: I would be happy to. It’s one of my favorite
subjects. Let me begin by describing an animal trial that took place in
early sixteenth century France. One of the scholars who have studied
at 340-42 (discussing the judicial statesmanship that tries to create agreement
and preserve political fraternity between the parties through the judge’s
“rationalizing” and “commensurating” opinion even though the conflict between
the parties may involve “incommensurable” values).
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these sorts of trials, William Ewald, gives a good description of the
trial in an article he wrote in 1995:107
In 1522 some rats were placed on trial before the
ecclesiastical court in Autun. They were charged with a
felony: specifically, the crime of having eaten and wantonly
destroyed some barley crops in the jurisdiction. A formal
complaint against “some rats of the diocese” was presented
to the bishop’s vicar, who thereupon cited the culprits to
appear on a day certain, and who appointed a local jurist,
Barthélémy Chassenée . . . to defend them. Chassenée, then
forty-two, was known for his learning, but not yet famous;
the trial of the rats of Autun was to establish his reputation,
and launch a distinguished career in the law.
When his clients failed to appear in court, Chassenée
resorted to procedural arguments. His first tactic was to
invoke the notion of fair process, and specifically to
challenge the original writ for having failed to give the rats
due notice. The defendants, he pointed out, were dispersed
over a large tract of countryside, and lived in many villages;
a single summons was inadequate to notify them all.
Moreover, the summons was addressed only to some of the
rats of the diocese; but technically it should have been
addressed to them all.
Chassenée was successful in his argument, and the court
ordered a second summons to be read from the pulpit of
every local parish church; this second summons now
correctly addressed all the local rats, without exception. But
on the appointed day the rats again failed to appear.
Chassenée now made a second argument. His clients, he
reminded the court, were widely dispersed; they needed to
make preparations for a great migration, and those
preparations would take time. The court once again
conceded the reasonableness of the argument, and granted a
further delay in the proceedings. When the rats a third time
failed to appear, Chassenée was ready with a third argument.
The first two arguments had relied on the idea of procedural
107

William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?,
143 U. P A . L. R EV . 1889 (1995), partially reprinted in V IVIAN G ROSSWALD
C URRAN , C OMPARATIVE L AW : A N I NTRODUCTION 59-78 (2002). Ewald
draws substantially upon two earlier studies of animal trials. See E DWARD P.
E VANS , T HE C RIMINAL P ROSECUTION AND C APITAL P UNISHMENT OF
A NIMALS (1906); Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of
Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. P A .
L. R EV . 696 (1916).
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fairness; the third treated the rats as a class of persons who
were entitled to equal treatment under the law. He addressed
the court at length, and successfully demonstrated that, if a
person is cited to appear at a place to which he cannot come
in safety, he may lawfully refuse to obey the writ. And a
journey to court would entail serious perils for his clients.
They were notoriously unpopular in the region; and
furthermore they were rightly afraid of their natural enemies,
the cats. Moreover (he pointed out to the court) the cats
could hardly be regarded as neutral in this dispute; for they
belonged to the plaintiffs. He accordingly demanded that the
plaintiffs be enjoined by the court, under the threat of severe
penalties, to restrain their cats, and prevent them from
frightening his clients. The court again found this argument
compelling; but now the plaintiffs seem to have come to the
end of their patience. They demurred to the motion; the
court, unable to settle on the correct period within which the
rats must appear, adjourned on the question sine die, and
judgment for the rats was granted by default.108

Dirty Harry: Well, if that ain’t the craziest, damnedest thing I
ever heard (sorry again Father)! I thought these two were pretty weird
(gesturing towards Professor Logie and Professor Hope), but that’s
not just weird; it’s insane. (After a pause) Okay, I get it; you’re
kidding me, right? It’s a joke.
Professor Roe: No, it’s no joke. The trial really happened, and
apparently it really did establish Chassenée’s reputation as a criminal
defense attorney.109 Moreover, over the course of his career it seems
that Chassenée worked on several other cases involving animal
prosecutions.110 And ten years after the trial in Autun he wrote a
treatise about putting insects on trial that was reprinted several times in
which he “discusses the full range of issues that can have been
expected to arise during a trial of ‘insect animals’: the jurisdiction of
the lay and ecclesiastical courts, the proper form of the complaint, the
issues of notice and of adequate representation by counsel, the
procedures to be followed at trial, and the passing and execution of
sentences.”111

108
109
110
111

Ewald, supra note 107, at 59-61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id.
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As the need to reprint Chassenée’s book suggests, he wasn’t alone.
In fact, Ewald tells us that “[f]rom the ninth century to the nineteenth,
in Western Europe, there are over two hundred well-recorded cases of
trials of animals, with the majority falling in the fifteenth, sixteenth,
and seventeenth centuries;” and those were just the recorded cases—
there were doubtless many more.112 As Ewald explains:
The animals known to have been placed on trial during
this period include: asses, beetles, bloodsuckers, bulls,
caterpillars, chickens, cockchafers, cows, dogs, dolphins,
eels, field mice, flies, goats, grasshoppers, horses, locusts,
mice, moles, pigeons, pigs, rats, serpents, sheep, slugs,
snails, termites, weevils, wolves, worms, and miscellaneous
vermin.113

As a general rule, wild animals were tried in the ecclesiastical
courts and domestic animals were tried in the ordinary criminal courts.
When vermin like rats were tried, because they were destroying crops
for example, the prosecution sought to deter them by seeking the
spiritual remedy of anathema or excommunication to eliminate the
infestation.114 But when domestic animals were tried because they had
killed someone, the prosecution sought to condemn and punish the
animal by seeking the temporal remedy of execution, sometimes
preceded by imprisonment.115 And occasionally the animals won, like
the rats of Autun effectively did in 1521; or like the snout beetles
infesting the plaintiff’s vineyards in St. Julien did in1546 when the
court issued a proclamation, before the case ever got to trial, observing
that the fruits of the earth were intended for insects as well as humans
and that it would be better for the plaintiffs “to implore the mercy of
heaven, and to seek pardon for their sins, than to proceed rashly
against the beetles;”116 or like the six piglets did in Savigny-sur-Etang
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 63. The infestation then disappeared. When it returned in 1587, and the
beetles were brought to trial, the plaintiffs proposed a compromise, setting aside
a field for the beetles in perpetuity and agreeing that “the insects had a legal
right to life, and to an adequate share of the earth’s bounty.” However, the
attorneys for the beetles rejected the offer because the land was in fact barren
and because they objected to various rights over the land reserved by the
plaintiffs, although it seems that some bugs or rats ate the final pages of the
extensive court records, so the final outcome is unknown. Id. at 63-64.
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in 1457, when they were acquitted of the crime of murdering and
partly devouring an infant although their sow mother had been found
guilty of the crime and hanged a month earlier.117
Dirty Harry: And I thought giving all those “due process” rights
to criminal punks was bad enough. Now you’re telling me they used to
give the same kinds of rights to animals as well. Next thing you’ll be
telling me they had to “Mirandize” them when they got arrested. I
guess they must have had a bunch of liberals running around then too.
Professor Roe: I don’t know about that, Inspector. Some of the
executions were pretty gruesome, and sometimes the animal was
tortured beforehand.118 And let’s not forget that heretics were also
being executed during the same time period as the cases involving the
rats, the beetles, and the piglets—and not necessarily after getting a
hearing.119
Dirty Harry: So, let me get this straight. They put some animals
on trial, with lots of due process protections, but some humans didn’t
even get a trial before they were burned at the stake or whatever
because they didn’t believe right. And then, even though they’d been
real nice to the animals by giving them a trial, when they did punish
them, they were often real cruel. Now that doesn’t make much sense,
does it? Sounds like a lot of superstitious and primitive medieval
mumbo-jumbo to me. I’d say they must have been real punks.
Father Pope: Before you continue, let me just make it clear that
the Church doesn’t execute heretics any more, and we don’t put
animals on trial either—just in case you were wondering.
Professor Roe: Well Inspector, that’s the sixty-four-dollar
question, isn’t it: Just what were they thinking? Of course, we can
never really know, can we, because they are long dead and the
historical materials and what we can infer from them are limited.
However, the important thing is to try. We must try to enter their point
of view, their worldview, to see things through their eyes, not ours.
Only in this way can we hope to “make sense” of what might seem
like “nonsense” to us.120 To do this we must first acknowledge our
117

118
119

120

Id. at 65. The piglets were acquitted “[b]ecause of their youth, because their
mother had set a bad example, and because the evidence was not sufficient to
convict.” Id.
Id. at 65, 72.
See id. at 62-63 (discussing Chassenée’s own involvement in such an episode
involving the extirpation of Waldenses in the villages of Cabrières and Merindol
in 1540-41).
See id. at 70 (identifying the problem as being “to make sense” of things).
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own situatedness in a particular time and place and set of
circumstances,121 how our “perceptual prisms” and “substructural
categorizations” shape our perceptions and understanding,122 and how
those perceptions and that understanding are also influenced by many
different kinds of cognitive biases.123 Once we have done this, which
of course requires a significant degree of epistemological humility,124
we are then in a better position to try to understand what at first might
seem so strange, unfamiliar, or even absurd to us, as the animal trials
undoubtedly do, by trying to see matters through the prisms and
categorizations of the culture that produced those trials. Karen
121

122

123

124

See, e.g., Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative
Law, 26 H ARV . I NT ’ L . L.J. 411 (1985), partially reprinted in V ICKI C.
J ACKSON & M ARK V. T USHNET , C OMPARATIVE C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW 151,
186 (1999) (emphasizing the importance, in the context of comparative law, of
becoming aware of, and making the effort to transcend, “subjectivity, . . . the
observer’s perspective and experience,” that is an inevitable part of growing up
in a particular culture). For a good sense of the situatedness of modernity and of
its mechanistic and reductionist Cartesian-Newtonian worldview, see Fritjof
Capra, Turning Point: A Science of Living Systems, http://www.earthand
spiritcenter.org/assets/Meditation%203%20readings%20fall%202015/3-2%20
Turning%20PointA%20Science%20of%20Living%20Systems%20-%20Fritjof
%20Capra.pdf (discussing the emergence of a new, ecological and holistic
worldview involving a systems approach to the understanding of living
biological and social systems); see also R ICHARD T ARNAS , C OSMOS AND
P SYCHE 16-25 (2006) (discussing the trajectory of human consciousness from
the participating consciousness of the primal worldview to the differentiated and
alienated consciousness of the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview); Narvaez,
Neurobiology, supra note 60, at 8 (discussing “[d]etached [m]orality in Western
[c]ivilization”).
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in
U.S. Comparative Law, 46 A M . J. C OMP. L. 43 (1998), partially reprinted in
V IVIAN G ROSSWALD C URRAN , C OMPARATIVE L AW : A N I NTRODUCTION 4041 (2002) (discussing “cultural immersion” in comparative law).
See ANDREW N EWBERG & M ARK W ALDMAN , W HY W E B ELIEVE W HAT W E
B ELIEVE : U NCOVERING O UR B IOLOGICAL N EED FOR M EANING ,
S PIRITUALITY , AND T RUTH 253-58 (2006) (identifying twenty-seven “cognitive
biases” that represent various “assumptions, generalizations, oversights, and
mistakes” in our perceptions and interpretations of perceptual information
during the “reconstruction of reality [that] is the foundation from which we
construct all our beliefs about the world”).
See, e.g., D INESH D ’S OUZA , W HAT ’ S S O G REAT A BOUT C HRISTIANITY ? 16778 (2007) (chapter entitled The World Beyond Our Senses: Kant and the Limits
of Reason); R ICHARD T ARNAS , T HE P ASSION OF THE W ESTERN M IND :
U NDERSTANDING THE I DEAS T HAT H AVE S HAPED O UR W ORLD V IEW 395402 (1991) (discussing postmodernism).
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Armstrong would call this expansion of our moral imagination the
“science of compassion”125 and say that it also requires us to apply the
same “principle of charity” applicable to the translation of texts written
in a foreign language, that is, “when we are confronted with discourse
that is strange to us, we seek an ‘interpretation which, in the light of
what it knows of the facts, will maximise truth among the sentences of
the corpus.’”126
Professor Hope: And comparatists like Vivian Curran who do
comparative law and try to understand foreign legal cultures would
call it “cultural immersion.127 They would also agree with the analogy
to language—more than just an analogy in fact, because comparative
law often requires working with foreign languages—and point out that
the challenge is essentially one of translation.
Can we ever fully succeed at this? Of course not—as the wellknown saying goes, something is always “lost in translation.” Thus
“the comparatist will fail to grasp a foreign legal culture completely
from within.”128 But that doesn’t mean we should not try to come as
close as we can by “trying to understand foreign legal cultures in an
untranslated form; i.e., through the prisms that shape perceptions in the
target legal culture.”129
125

See A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 116-17 (describing the “‘science of
compassion’ that should characterize the work of a religious historian” as “a
method of acquiring ‘knowledge’ (Latin: scientia) by entering in a scholarly,
empathetic way into the historical period that is being researched” and thereby
“mak[ing] place for the other”). Armstrong takes the phrase “science of
compassion” from Louis Massignon, Les Nusayris, in L’ ELABORATION DE L ’
I SLAM (Claude Cahen, ed. 1961). Id. at 207 n.1.
126
Id. at 138-39 (quoting N.L. Wilson, in I AN H ACKING , W HY D OES L ANGUAGE
M ATTER TO P HILOSOPHY ? 148 (1975)).
127
Curran, supra note 122, at 38-41.
128
Id. at 41.
129
Id. at 40. Curran elaborates as follows:
The immersion approach rejects the absolutist mentality. It
contemplates a slow pushing against cultural barriers towards
an ideal of mutual comprehension, a striving to approach
comprehension, and a recognition that some distances will
remain. Rather than failure, it implies the need to accept that
others have different truths. The more deeply one gains
insights into the particularities of foreign legal cultures,
influenced by the flavors of each country’s habits, history,
language, preoccupations, and social circumstances, the more
aware the comparatist becomes of irreducible incomparables.
Id. at 123.

2016

Beyond Punks in Empty Chairs

353

And we do need to make this kind of effort to understand the
Other—whether that Other is something “foreign” among our own
ancestors, such as the animal trials, or something “foreign” among
people in another part of the world, such as Islam, or even something
that seems “foreign” to us among people in our own country, such as
an opponent’s position on same-sex marriage or abortion.130 Moreover,
with immigration from other countries, we encounter more and more
“foreign” things from other parts of the world among people in this
country as well. Of course, when we make the effort to understand
other people who are alive today, we have a great advantage in that we
can actually talk to them in person.
Dirty Harry: Why do I get the feeling that you are ganging up on
me? But, you see, that’s where you’ve lost me. Why should I make this
kind of effort to understand “punks”?
Professor Hope: Because, as I said before, once you have listened
and tried to understand, then the other person really might not seem to
be such a “punk” after all.
Professor Roe: Let’s go back to the animal trials again.
Remember, our challenge is to try to “make sense” of what might
seem to us to be “nonsense.” And let’s assume, with Fukuyama, that
human nature and fundamental cognitive capacities are basically the
same whatever the time period or place, even though they will be
modulated in distinctive cultural patterns—for example, some cultures
may be highly religious, while others may not be, as in the case of
130

Regarding the similarities in trying to understand the “foreign” Other in these
different contexts, Curran explains:
Since accepting the idea of human plurality and difference
also applies to differences within legal cultures, the obstacles
to successful immersion and to successful comparison are
different in degree, but not in kind, among different
communities within a single nation’s legal culture, and among
legal cultures of different nations. Comparative law, when
conducted effectively, should thus be an instructive model for
all legal analysis.
Id. See also K RONMAN , supra note 106, at 93-101 (discussing the value of
“political fraternity” and defining it as “a kind of statesmanship in pianissimo”
whereby every member of the political community displays an attitude of
“sympathetic detachment,” meaning that, especially where the alternatives
are incommensurable, they will endeavor “to place [themselves] imaginatively
in the position of others and to entertain their concerns in the same affirmative
spirit they do, while remaining uncommitted to the values and beliefs that give
these concerns their force” yet also being open to revising their preliminary
views and making a more informed choice among the alternatives).
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modern Europe.131 Now, clearly the participants themselves—lawyers
like Chassenée, for example—did not consider that the animal trials, or
even the trials or execution of heretics, were “nonsense.” Such things
made perfect “sense” to them; and we should assume, applying the
“principle of charity,” that they had “good reasons” for doing what
they did—that doing these things seemed “reasonable” to them within
their worldview. We may think that they were not good reasons, or
even that they were in fact very bad reasons, but that is another issue.
That has to do with judgment.
The point is that, before we reach a judgment about the worth of
the animal trials and about the views and beliefs of the participants, we
should first try to understand those practices and those views and
beliefs from within. We should try to grasp their reasons and the
worldview that informs them. Otherwise we risk an “unwarranted
imposition of judgment emanating from a certainty of possessing
objective truth.”132 And we don’t want to do that; instead, we want to
reach an “informed” judgment. But we can only do that, if we first
understand. Then, once we understand, we may change our original
view of the matter; or maybe we won’t. As Curran says, we still have
to “struggle over whether and when normative judgments are
applicable or desirable.”133
Dirty Harry: So, you’re saying they still might be “punks.”
131

132
133

See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing “a trans-historical concept
of man”); see also A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 138 (maintaining that “when
making an effort to understand something strange and alien to you, it is
important to assume that the speaker shares the same human nature as
yourself”).
Curran, supra note 122, at 121.
And then, of course, there is the vexing question regarding the normative
standards that will form the basis of judgment. Regarding the relationship
between cultural immersion (i.e., understanding) and judgment, Curran offers
the following insights:
There are no theoretical formulas for engaging in both
simultaneously. The answer, if one can call it an answer, lies
in what Nussbaum refers to as natural human practices of
compassion and ethical commitment. If the latter are practiced
in a context of cultural immersion, perhaps the resulting
judgments can better avoid or mitigate some of the excesses
that historically have been associated with a certainty of
possessing truth, while also avoiding an abdication of political
action on behalf of oppressed minorities.
Id. at 122 (referencing Martha Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for
Reasoned Commitment, 6 Y ALE J.L. & H UM . 197 (1994)).
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Professor Roe: Well, if you insist on putting it in those terms, yes,
I suppose I am. But remember, they might not be. And you won’t
know unless you first try to understand. That’s the point.
Professor Hope: What’s more, you may even discover when you
do this with people today, that there are far fewer “punks” than you
thought—that most people, in fact, are not “punks.”
Dirty Harry: You’re ganging up again. But back to these animal
trials—I still don’t get it. Those people still seem like punks to me.
Professor Roe: As I said, we must try to understand their reasons
for doing what they did, which means we must try to understand their
views and beliefs about things, which means, again, trying to see
things through their eyes, through their own prisms and categories. So,
that is what several scholars have tried to do. I won’t go into all the
different theories and speculations here, because I don’t need to do that
to make my point. It will be enough just to consider how Ewald tries to
do this. So, Ewald examines six or seven different explanations that
have been put forward for the animal trials over the centuries—that
their purpose was to make sure the incident would be forgotten, to
make sure it would not be forgotten, to deter other animals, or to deter
humans; or to punish demons possessing the animals, Satan using
them as instruments, or the animals themselves (because they are
rational creatures who should be held responsible for their actions).134
Apart from the specific problems Ewald identifies with these
individual explanations, the basic problem with all of them is that
although they can explain the remedy or the punishment, for various
reasons they cannot ultimately explain, or fully explain, the trial.135
And so Ewald searches for the explanation that can. He concludes that
Chassenée himself accepted Thomas Aquinas’s view that the animals
were “the guiltless instruments of Satan” and that the remedies granted
and punishments inflicted were “an indirect way of cursing the
Devil.”136 But, despite sometimes cruel punishments, the trial itself
was “a sign of moral respect.”137 Thus “[w]here we see in a rat or a pig
either useless vermin or a reservoir of animal protein, [Chassenée] saw
fellow creatures who enjoyed certain basic rights that can be
vindicated at law.”138
134
135
136
137
138

Ewald, supra note 107, at 65-69.
See generally id.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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Consistently, Ewald rejects the notion that the animal trials and
punishments were simply brutal and inhumane by modern standards.
Although some of the punishments were indeed brutal, he reminds us
that sometimes the animals won and that the parties in the snout beetle
case even recognized that the beetles had a right to live, observing that
this “contrasts markedly with the modern attitude” and noting that
according to one estimate about 27,000 species of animals, mostly
insects, are going extinct each year due to human activity.139 He
considers that “[w]e are horrified by the brutality of the animal trials;
but it does not take much imagination to see that Chassenée would be
equally horrified by our wanton extermination, without trial, of God’s
creation.”140
In this regard, I should note that Ewald identifies two worldviews
that “still jostled” with one another at the time of Chassenée. The
medieval worldview, held by Chassenée, “counseled humility,
resignation, and the insignificance of all things merely human” (given
humanity’s fallenness), recognized “human beings and animals as
being alike God’s creatures,” and divided the world into godly humans
and animals, on the one hand, and ungodly humans and animals, on
the other.141 The newer, humanist worldview of the Renaissance,
which set the trajectory for modernity, “saw humanity as participating
in aspects of the divine” and tended towards dividing the world
“between the brutal and the humane, with all animals falling in one
category, and most humans in the other.”142 These differing
worldviews generated quite different “sensibilities” or “emotional
responses to the world.”143
Perhaps Ewald’s explanation of these trials is correct; perhaps it is
not. My own view is that the trial was not just “a mark of moral
respect” for the animals but may have had a very practical purpose.
Thus, a trial may have been held to determine not just the mundane
facts of the case (did the insects in fact destroy the plaintiff’s crops;
did the pig in fact crush the child?) but whether or not the animal was,
in fact, simply the instrument of Satan or, instead, somehow an
instrument of God, as the snout beetles appeared to be.144 It is
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
Id.
Id. at 74.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the snout beetle case).
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important to know this before pronouncing a “curse” because it would
be blasphemous to pronounce a “curse” if the animals were God’s
instruments.145 Whatever the correct explanation and understanding
might be, however, Ewald is surely correct when he observes that
[T]he differences between ourselves and Chassenée exist,
not just at the level of cognition, but also in the very
constitution of our moral sentiments. To put the point
another way: what separates us from Chassenée—what
makes the animal trials both so elusive and so revealing—is
not just a shift in a single concept, but in an entire frame of
reference. We set out to study these strange legal
proceedings of our ancestors; and at every turn we have been
brought face-to-face with alien sensibilities, alien
metaphysics. And by “metaphysics” here I mean
metaphysics in its most full-blooded sense—the subject that
addresses such questions as: What is a person? What is an
animal? What is the essence of freedom? What is justice?
How is reality constituted, and to what ends? To understand
Chassenée, it seems, we need to recapture lost images, a
forgotten range of experience: an entire way of thinking and
feeling about the world. 146

So, you see, to understand what was really going on with these
animal trials, and to understand the people involved in them, we need
to enter a world with a quite different metaphysics, epistemology, and
morality than our own. And, in light of all that, do you still think those
involved in these trials were “punks”?
Dirty Harry: Okay, I guess I can see that maybe they weren’t
quite as crazy as I first thought now that you’ve explained what might
have been going on in their minds. It’s still pretty weird, though. But
why did you tell me about all this again? I’m still not sure I get the
point of it.
Professor Roe: Well, as Professor Hope mentioned earlier, just as
we needed to try to get into the minds of those ancestors involved in
the animal trials, so we need to do the same thing when we are dealing
with other people today, whether they are here in this country or in
other parts of the world, before we make judgments about them or
decide on actions and policies based on those judgments. That way,
our judgments will be better, and so will our actions and policies, just
as our judgment about the animal trials was better once we had a better
145
146

See Ewald, supra note 107, at 68 (discussing the views of Thomas Aquinas).
Id. at 74.

358

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 312

understanding of what might have been going on with them. So we
first need to listen to others and try to understand them.
Professor Hope: Karen Armstrong puts it this way in her book
Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life:
The “principle of charity” and the “science of
compassion” are both crucial to any attempt to understand
discourse and ideas that initially seem baffling, distressing,
and alien; we have to re-create the entire context in which
such words are spoken—historical, cultural, political,
intellectual—question them deeply, and . . . drive our
understanding to the point where we have “an immediate
grasp of what a given position meant.” With this new
empathetic understanding of the context, we will find that
we can imagine ourselves, in similar circumstances, feeling
the same. In other words, we have to see where people are
coming from. In this way, we can broaden our perspective
and “make place for the other.” We can ignore this
compassionate imperative only if we do not wish to
understand other people—an ethically problematic
position.147

Moreover, when we do this, we may well discover that instances of
the “dark side” of thymos manifested by others are rooted in various
kinds of emotional pain and suffering, such as frustration, humiliation,
despair, and fear, and perhaps even a sense of betrayal and atrocity.148
Of course, remember that developing such empathetic understanding
147

148

A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 139 (citing and quoting M ARSHALL G.S.
H ODGSON , 1 T HE V ENTURE OF I SLAM : C ONSCIENCE AND H ISTORY IN W ORLD
C IVILIZATION 379 (1974)); see id. at 116-17, 207 n.1. For the phrase “science
of compassion,” see supra note 125 and accompanying text. For the phrase
“principle of charity,” see supra note 126 and accompanying text. See also
S ACKS , supra note 60, at 152-53, 158, 168-69, 172, 179-80 (the importance of
role reversal in Genesis in creating empathy and sympathy and thus in
humanizing the other and defeating dualism).
For discussion of some examples illustrating this point, see A RMSTRONG , supra
note 60, at 137 (Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religious fundamentalism), 140
(terrorists and their sympathetic co-religionists), 146-47 (inhabitants of and
immigrants from former colonies), 187-88 (our enemy). See also F UKUYAMA ,
supra note 11, at 235-37 (Islamic fundamentalism), 237 (self-segregation of
African Americans). Such instances may also be part of a bigger picture. See,
e.g., Bob Dylan, Only a Pawn in Their Game, on THE TIMES THEY ARE ACHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964), http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/onlypawn-their-game (song about the 1963 murder of a civil rights activist). I am
indebted to my good friend and colleague, Gary Simson, for this thought and
Dylan reference.
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does not preclude judgment; thus “[w]e can never condone cruelty,
ruthless violence, terrorism, or systemic injustice.”149 However, as
Armstrong reminds us, we also need to remember that “in a
threatening environment, the brain becomes permanently organized for
aggression”150 and that we have our own “dark side” as well.151 And
we should always be mindful that every human being is a “numinous
mystery.”152
An acknowledgement of “mystery” is also at the heart of my good
friend and colleague Jack Sammons’s proposal for reinvigorating and
restoring civility to our democratic political conversation in the United
States.153 Sammons laments “the dead language of an exchange of
concepts understood as prejudices and interests” that reflect and
constitute our current “false and incomplete” identities and wants us to
149
150

151

152

153

A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 140, 186.
Id. at 186 (discussing our “enemy”); see also Narvaez, Mature Moral
Functioning, supra note 60, at 31 (“Situations can promote one ethic or another.
Fearful situations activate the security ethic, whereas nurturing situations are
likely to activate the engagement ethic.”); Narvaez, Neurobiology, supra note
60, at 7-8 (discussing “bunker security” and “vicious imagination,” with
particular reference to religious fundamentalism).
A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 186 (suggesting that “you, your own nation, and
your own tradition also have flaws and, in all likelihood, have committed serious
crimes against others in the past or, perhaps, even in the present” and that,
“[given] the ‘shadow’ in your own mind . . . [p]erhaps in different
circumstances, you too would be capable of evil actions”).
Id. at 128. Armstrong is here referring to those “we encounter during the day”
but the point is surely a more general one.
At their most insightful, the religions have insisted that the
core of each man and woman eludes our grasp and is
transcendent. . . . Yet most of us fail to express . . . reverence
for others in our daily lives. All too often we claim
omniscience about other people, other nations, other cultures,
and even those we claim to love, and our views about them are
frequently colored by our own needs, fears, ambitions, and
desires. . . . Instead of discoursing confidently on other
people’s motives, intentions, and desires, we should recall the
essential “mystery” and realize that there is a certain sacrilege
in attempting to “pluck out” its heart to serve an agenda of our
own.
Id. at 125-27 (referencing Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s attempt to “pluck out
the heart of [Hamlet’s] mystery”).
Jack L. Sammons, Some Concluding Reflections—Recovering the Political: The
Problem with Our Political Conversations, 63 M ERCER L. R EV . 899 (2012).
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“go beyond [it] to the point of judgment.”154 However, such judgment
can only be attained if we prepare for and engage in “repeated, long,
face-to-face talks with opposing others about matters that [are truly]
serious.”155 Here I take him to be proposing that we need to listen to
and try to understand one another as we simultaneously seek to
persuade.156 Thus:
[We need to] talk more. We need to talk, face-to-face, with
those we oppose; talk about political matters far more
serious than what level of taxation is optimal, or how to
deliver health care, or more serious than abortions, gay
rights, immigration, race, or what to do about various other
social inequalities. Pick the issue you care most about right
now, ask why anyone, you included, should care about it at
all aside from self-interest; take your most thoughtful answer
to that question and ask why anyone, you included again,
should care about the value(s) upon which it rests; take your
most thoughtful answer to that question and ask what the
words you just used to describe these value(s) mean, where
they come from, and why and how they prompt your caring.
Now offer this thought in as persuasive and as personal a
manner as you can in a face-to-face political conversation
with someone with whom you typically disagree, someone
about whom you might now say you do not understand how
he could hold the views he does.157

154

155
156

157

Id. at 901-02, 912. Sammons observes that our current “false and incomplete”
identities are “extremely hard to resist, providing as they do a certain security
and stability.” However,
Rather than the comfort of a truer identity, these identities
produce only constant apprehension, defined as they are
against others we do not understand and over whom we have
no real possibility of control. A people so defined feel the
constant, unrelenting tug of the impossible demands of
needing to master the wills of difficult others. They feel the
fear that if this tug is not acted upon, the others, who feel the
same need, will master them.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 911-12.
Id. at 906 (observing that our political conversation “is no longer a rhetorical
one,” meaning that “speakers in it no longer seek means of persuasion”).
Id. at 905-06. Sammons stresses the importance of the last question “for the idea
is to get to the openings that language, and only language, can provide.” Id. at
906 n.25. Sammons emphasizes what he does not envisage:
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Such “serious” conversations will take us to the place where the
conversation will point beyond itself to the “ordinary mystery and
silence that surrounds us,” to the “mysteriousness of our being” which
is “not us but defines us,” to the “imagined community” or “polity”
that constitutes our truer, more authentic identity and that informs our
judgments.158 By engaging in such conversations with humility before
this mystery and with faith in, and hope for, what it might reveal to
us,159 we will discover more of the truth about ourselves, recover the
art of rhetoric, and find our way to an honest and genuine civility.160

158

159
160

I am not intending to describe a dialectic [seeking objective
truth]. Nor do I mean to be saying that participation in the
political conversation requires openness to opposing positions,
or that all beliefs are to be held tentatively, or that expressed
beliefs be capable of a publicity of reason or, if religious,
equally motivated by secular reasons before being offered in
political conversation.
Id. at 907, n.29. However, Sammons concedes that the conversation does require
“openness,” albeit “not the openness that dialectic requires.” Id. at 908 n.31. The
openness envisaged, then, seems to be directed towards ensuring listening
and understanding of an opponent’s position, but not necessarily acceptance of
that position or modification of one’s own.
Id. at 903, 908, 912 (mystery), 904 (not us but defines us), 904 and n.18
(imagined community or polity), 901, 902, 912 (inauthentic identities, truer
identity), 904 and n.18, 908-09 (informing judgments). Regarding the meaning
of “mystery” as used here, see id. at 903 n.15 (explaining “mystery” not as
“something that is a mystery to us” but as “something that is mystery, something
that could not be approached in the way of explanation at all without utterly
destroying it”).
Id. at 905 (humility), 903-04, 910 (faith), 906-07 (hope).
Id. at. 908-09 (truth about ourselves), 906-07, 909-12 (art of rhetoric), 911
(civility). Sammons also considers that this will also “bind us to one another
despite our differences,” including by “providing the motivation to listen to
speech that seeks (only!) to persuade us.” Id. at 910 and n.35.
By including discussion of Jack’s position here I do not mean to imply that
he considers there is necessarily a moral obligation to understand one’s
opponent. As Jack explains in a comment on a draft of this Article:
My argument begins with the one speaking. It is he who must
take those steps you quoted and he does so to open himself in
a way in which listening to others, among other things, does
not require some external moral motivation for justification. It
is an attempted practical turn to an appreciation of our
grounding in mystery which makes any true conversation
possible. . . The key to it . . . is the turn to language itself. . . .
The “imagined community” to which I refer is the one opened
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Karen Armstrong’s “science of compassion” is broader than Jack
Sammons’s “serious” conversations, both in its intended range of
application (it is not restricted to democratic political conversation)
and in the range of considerations to be taken into account in trying to
understand others.161 However, to recur to our metaphor of the chairs,
both of them seem to be suggesting that we should pull our chairs
closer together, lean forward, and listen attentively to what others are
saying (sometimes, as Armstrong envisages, even when others are not
speaking to us in actual dialogue).162
Moreover, Armstrong and Sammons both acknowledge the
presence and importance of mystery. And here I should point out that
part of the “mystery” is how we may be transformed ourselves by
coming to understand others, whether or not our ultimate judgment is
changed as a result of achieving that understanding. Armstrong’s
approach tends to the cultivation and exercise of empathy,163 and
Sammons’s approach tends to the acquisition of a more authentic
identity, although the “serious” conversations he envisages would
surely also tend to the cultivation and exercise of empathy. Related,

161

162

163

through this process of self-questioning through language. It is
the same, one might say, as the imagined community of music.
Email from Jack Sammons to Mark Jones (Dec. 18, 2013) (on file with author).
This said, I hope Jack will accept that if Dirty Harry is still not motivated to
listen to those he considers “punks” after reading Jack’s lovely article (through
appreciating the intrinsic value of the conversation and the imagined community
that it reveals), then perhaps he may be so motivated after reading this one.
This said, there would seem to be no reason why Sammons’s approach could not
be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to other types of dialogue envisaged by
Armstrong, in addition to democratic political conversation.
Where there is actual dialogue, of course, listening skills will be critical. For a
sampling of the literature on listening skills, see, e.g., P ERSPECTIVES ON
L ISTENING (Andrew D. Wolvin & Carolyn Gwynn Coakley, eds. 1993); Mark
Weisberg & Jean Koh Peters, Experiments in Listening, 57 J. L EG . E D . 427
(2007); Neil Hamilton, Effectiveness Requires Listening: How to Assess and
Improve Listening Skills, 13 F LA . C OASTAL L. R EV . 145 (2011-12).
As the title of her book suggests, Armstrong describes many practical steps,
methods, and resources designed to cultivate the qualities of empathy and
compassion. Moreover, in 2008 she announced a major international initiative
that was launched in 2009—a Charter for Compassion “that would be written by
leading thinkers from a variety of major faiths and would restore compassion to
the heart of religious and moral life.” A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 5-6, 8. For
the text of the Charter, see http://www.charterforcompassion.org/index.php/
charter. For further information on the Charter, see http://charterfor
compassion.org/.
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where there is actual dialogue (as will often be the case with
Armstrong and always with Sammons) the parties may give one
another the gift of a more “authentic,” because more rational,
recognition and do “spiritual justice” to one another resulting in more
“spiritual peace” in their souls. Even in the absence of dialogue, just
the effort to understand another person, to move beyond our own
preconceptions and prejudices, is likely to effect a thymotic “spiritual
adjustment” in our souls. Moreover, under both approaches the
potential for a modification of pre-existing views and positions would
seem to be considerable and thus our ultimate judgment is indeed
likely to be different, or certainly more nuanced, in the light of greater
understanding.164 We may even approach a point, as we learn more
about others, where we could say, with the Roman playwright
Terence, “nothing human is foreign to me.”165
In other words, Inspector Callahan, you are less likely to conclude
that other people are “punks” once you have come to understand them
better, and why they believe what they believe and do what they do.
Dirty Harry: Okay, well let’s assume, for the heck of it, that if I
tried to understand those people I now think are punks, then I might
see that they’re not really punks. Why should I do that? What do I
actually get out of it? This Karen Armstrong person seems to be
suggesting I will become more empathetic and compassionate. And
this Sammons guy says I will acquire a “more authentic identity” if I
do this in political conversations. And you say that I will get a more
“authentic recognition” through dialogue in which another person
listens to and tries to understand me as well, and that that this will give
me “spiritual justice” and “spiritual peace” in my own soul too, which
is along the lines of what you said before, and now you say that I will
get some “spiritual adjustment” even in the absence of dialogue. Well,
even if the other person isn’t really a punk, why should I care?
Suppose all those things don’t really grab me as a motivation?
Suppose I can get much more of what I want—more material things
164

165

The CIA employs this kind of approach “to teach its intelligence-gathering
analysts to think more wisely and open-mindedly,” although one suspects that
achieving “spiritual justice” and “spiritual peace” is not uppermost among their
purposes. See NEWBERG & WALDMAN, supra note 123, at 258-60 (describing
eight strategies used by the CIA in its “[w]ar against [b]iases”).
K RONMAN , supra note 106, at 159 (quoting the “old Roman motto” from
Terence); see also Curran, supra note 122, at 123 (“Such bridging of distances
as we are likely to realize [through cultural immersion] will entail mutual
transformations in the process of comprehension.”).

364

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 312

and more thymotic satisfaction—by and even violence, especially if
“my gun is bigger than the other guy’s” (which, as you know, it is)? I
already told you I didn’t feel the need for any “recognition” from
punks. And quite frankly, I don’t feel the need to be more empathetic
and compassionate, to acquire some “authentic identity” from our
shared “mystery,” or to get “recognition” and “spiritual justice” and
“spiritual peace” even from those who aren’t punks. I’m just fine as I
am thank you.
Father Pope: Are you really, Inspector? That’s not what you told
us before: You said you were looking for a “better way to a better
world” because your old way was getting you down. Quite honestly, I
think you have identified a real problem, maybe even the biggest
problem. The problem is that the way we are made—or perhaps I
should say, the way we are made in a fallen world—we are all
naturally selfish. Sure we can be altruistic and selfless too sometimes,
but it is a constant battle for us.166 Even if things like justice and peace,
listening and understanding, empathy and compassion, authentic
identity and authentic recognition sound good in theory, it is so hard to
do the things necessary to achieve them in practice because we are
broken people living in a broken world. So the challenge is not only to
find ways to achieve these things; it is finding ways to help us
overcome our natural selfishness in order to want, or desire, them
strongly enough in the first place.
Perhaps what we need to do, then, is to try to see through the
surface appearances of all our divisions to the reality of our underlying
common humanity. When asked to pray at a mixed gathering with
people of different religions and no religion, I like to use an inclusive
prayer that says “We pray as children of a common Father.”167 But
166

167

See C ATECHISM , supra note 83, at § 1707 (“[Man] still desires the good, but his
nature bears the wound of original sin.”); C ATHOLIC C HURCH , P ASTORAL
C ONSTITUTION ON THE C HURCH IN THE M ODERN W ORLD : G AUDIEM ET S PES
13 § 2 (1965) (“[M]an is split within himself. As a result, all of human life,
whether individual or collective, shows itself to be a dramatic struggle between
good and evil, between light and darkness.”) [hereinafter G AUDIEM ET S PES ];
see also supra note 60 (discussing neurobiological aspects of moral functioning,
and our “old” brain, limbic system, and “new” brain). Moreover, even our
altruism may become corrupted and turn into “altruistic evil” in which, while
altruistically beholden to our own in-group, we do evil to out-groups in the name
of an “altruistic cause.” See supra notes 60, 63 (discussing reciprocal altruism
and altruistic evil respectively).
This prayer form was used for many years by Father Thomas Healy,
distinguished alumnus of Mercer University and Mercer Law School and a
priest in the Roman Catholic diocese of Savannah, when he offered prayers at
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what does this mean? I think it means two things, First, it means that
each of us is of immeasurable worth and dignity in the eyes of the God
who created us and who loves us.168 Remember how, on Fukuyama’s
account, Hegel-Kojève stressed that “[t]he Christian God recognizes
all human beings universally, recognizes their individual human worth
and dignity.”169 I think that this understates the position because our
worth and dignity in the eyes of God are “immeasurable.” That is what
it means to be a “child of God” who is created “in the image and
likeness” of God.170 Think how you feel about your own children.171
And we must avoid the temptation to get caught up in a numbers
game. Numbers may mean something at the merely human level but

168
169

170

171

various Law School events in the 1980s. I think it fair to say that Father Healy’s
prayers touched everyone who heard them.
See C ATECHISM , supra note 83, at §§ 219-21 (on God’s love).
F UKUYAMA , supra note 11, at 197 (quoted supra note 52 and accompanying
text).
See, e.g., C ATECHISM , supra note 83, at § 222, § 225 (stating that believing in
and loving the One God “means knowing the unity and true dignity of all men:
Everyone is made in the image and likeness of God”) (emphasis added). Section
1700 states: “The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the
image and likeness of God; . . . it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine
beatitude . . . . It is essential to a human being freely to direct himself to this
fulfillment.” Section 1730 states that “God created man a rational being,
conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own
actions,” and that “[m]an is rational and therefore like God; he is created with
free will and is master over his acts.” Early in his pontificate, Pope Francis
emphasized that everyone, without exception, is a “child of God.” See Pope at
Mass: Culture of Encounter is the Foundation of Peace, VATICAN RADIO (May
22, 2013), http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2013/05/22/pope_at_mass:_culture_
of_encounter_is_the_foundation_of_peace/en1-694445:
The Lord created us in His image and likeness, and we are the
image of the Lord . . . The Lord has redeemed all of us, all of
us, with the Blood of Christ: all of us, not just Catholics.
Everyone! . . . Even the atheists. . . . And we all have a duty to
do good. And this commandment for everyone to do good, I
think, is a beautiful path towards peace. . . We are created
children in the likeness of God . . . [W]e are all children of
God, all of us, all of us! And God loves us, all of us!
For a discussion of analogous sensibilities in all the major religious and wisdom
traditions, emphasizing the cultivation and exercise of empathy and compassion,
see A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 29-64, 116-30.
Cf. Matthew 7:11 (New Am. Rev. ed. 2011) (“If you then, who are wicked,
know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your
heavenly Father give good things to those who ask him.”).
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when we are talking about God, who is infinite, numbers are
meaningless. To think in terms of numbers in some utilitarian fashion
with regard to God is, quite simply, a fundamental category mistake.172
Second, the prayer means that we are related to one another as
children through our common Creator; that we are, then, in a very real
sense—in a spiritual, not a biological, sense—sisters and brothers to
one another. And if we were able to see one another in this way, as
such brothers and sisters who all have immeasurable worth as God’s
children, wouldn’t that be a strong motivation for trying to overcome
our natural selfishness and for making the effort to be empathetic and
compassionate in order to seek justice and peace?
But, you will ask, how can we come to see each other this way, not
just cognitively, which is inadequate, but also affectively? How can
we, in other words, develop the necessary “sensibilities”? Well,
wouldn’t the knowledge that we are of immeasurable worth in the
sight of God, that we are valued and loved by the Creator of the
universe, provide the greatest and most authentic thymotic satisfaction
of all? Remember that we distinguished earlier between unhealthy
pride and a healthy sense of self-worth, a healthy pride if you will, that
comes from knowing one is valued and loved by God.173 And we said
it was a paradox because pride is regarded as a sin.174 However, it is
only an apparent paradox because we have to remember the other side
of the equation—humility before God. In other words, as I said before,
thymos has to undergo a type of transformation in which we
acknowledge that we have received the world, ourselves, and one
another as Gift that is entrusted to us as stewards.175 In this way, there
may still be a place for a healthy form of thymos in the divine
172

173
174
175

See, e.g., A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 53-54 (explaining that in the Talmudic
view of creation “all human beings were made in God’s image,” murder and
even humiliation of another was “a sacrilege,” and “God had created only one
man at the beginning of time to teach us that destroying a single human life was
equivalent to annihilating the world, while to save a life redeemed the entire
human race”); S ACKS , supra note 60, at 194, 201 (“God . . . has set his image in
each of us. That is why every life is sacred and each life is like a universe.”),
266 (“Islam, like Judaism, counts a single life as a universe”).
Supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Id.; see Outler, supra note 85 (Saint Augustine: “[God] dost resist the proud”].
See supra note 84 and accompanying text; C ATECHISM , supra note 83, at § 224
(believing in and loving the One God “means living in thanksgiving: if God is
the only One, everything we are and have comes from him”) (emphasis added);
see also § 299 (“creation as a gift addressed to man” and “a spirit of humility
and respect before the Creator and his work”).
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economy. In fact, I think that this is how it is supposed to work in
Christianity and religion more generally (or at least in the monotheistic
religions)—and although Hegel-Kojève seem to have understood this
at some level, ultimately they seem to miss the point. They seem to
suggest that Christianity was not really concerned with our earthly
lives and therefore needed to be secularized before we could expect
any real improvement in those lives.176 However, as you know, the two
great commandments of Christianity are to love God and to love your
neighbor as yourself,177 and loving your neighbor as yourself means
more than caring about the fate of their immortal soul. Although that is
important, it certainly does not justify being indifferent to their
circumstances here on earth.178
And I would say that awareness that we are valued and loved by
the God in whose eyes we, like others, have immeasurable worth, and
that we have received one another (and everything else) as Gift—and
this means the chairs in which we all sit and the human beings who sit
in those chairs—would engender such gratitude that it would demand,
in turn, that we recognize the same immeasurable value of others. That
would be irresistible surely—at least it would be if we truly believed
it.179 And this would then give us the motivation for making the effort
176
177

178

179

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Matthew 22: 34-40, Mark 12: 28-34, Luke 10:25-28 (New Am. Rev. ed. 2011);
see A RMSTRONG , supra note 60, at 29-64 (discussing these commandments in
Christianity and the analogous positions in other religious and wisdom
traditions).
See C ATECHISM , supra note 83, Part Three (Life in Christ), especially Section
One, Chapter Two, Article 3 (Social Justice) and Section Two, Chapter Two
(“You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself”). For example, the Article on
Social Justice states, in Section 1929, that “[s]ocial justice can be achieved only
in respecting the transcendent dignity of man” . . . in Section 1930, that
“[r]espect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his
dignity as a creature” . . . in Section 1931, that “[r]espect for the human person
proceeds by way of respect for the principle that ‘everyone should look upon his
neighbor (without any exception) as another self, above all bearing in mind his
life and the means necessary for living it with dignity’” . . . in Sections 19321933, that “[t]he duty of making oneself a neighbor to others and actively
serving them . . . extends to those who think or act differently from us”. . . . Id.
(quoting G AUDIEM ET S PES , supra note 166, at 27 § 1).
Of course, to reach this point of belief, we have to overcome the mimetic desire
of our various sibling rivalries by recognizing that God’s love is inexhaustible
and that being loved by God is not a zero-sum game. See SACKS, supra note 60,
at 102, 141-43, 203-04, 266. Thus “[t]he truth that shines through the Genesis
texts is that we are each blessed by God, each precious in his sight, each with
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to try to understand one another, and for exercising the empathy and
compassion we need to do that. Pace Hegel-Kojève, then, perhaps the
problem with Christianity, as has been famously remarked by others, is
not that it has been “tried and found wanting” but that it has never
actually been “tried.”180
Dirty Harry: Well, I suppose it might provide the motivation if, as
you say, we truly believed in that kind of inclusive, loving God. But
suppose I don’t even believe in God? Then what?
Professor Hope: May I jump in here, Father? Of course, there are
philosophers who have sought to provide non-religious accounts of
inherent human dignity; and here one thinks especially of philosophers
in the Kantian tradition. However, there is a problem in finding and
justifying a secular foundation for such dignity.181 Instead of trying to
grapple with the thorny issues raised by this problem, which are
beyond my expertise anyway—and at this hour, I suspect that
Professor Logie does not want to get into them either—let me see if I
can take something Father Pope has just said in a different direction by
putting it together with something Professor Logie told us about.
Specifically, Professor Logie explained that Hobbes, Locke, and
Hegel all proposed “experiments in thought” to get at the essence of
human nature by positing the situation of the “first men” in the state of
nature,182 For Hegel, you will recall, it was a bloody battle for pure
prestige at the very beginning of history.183 Well, I would like to
propose another “experiment in thought”—an apocalyptic one focused
on the end of history. Let’s assume that there has been a cataclysm of
some kind and you are the last human being left alive on the planet, or
so it seems. I am sure you are familiar with the idea from various sci-fi
movies.184 Fukuyama entitles his book The End of History and the Last

180

181

182
183
184

our own role in his story, each with our own song in the music of humankind.”
Id. at 266.
G.K. Chesterton famously said: “The Christian ideal has not been tried and
found wanting. It has been found difficult and left untried.” G.K. C HESTERTON ,
W HAT ’ S W RONG WITH THE W ORLD Part I, Chapter 5 (1910).
See, e.g., M ICHAEL J. P ERRY , T HE I DEA OF H UMAN R IGHTS : F OUR I NQUIRIES
(1998) (especially chapter 1).
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
For an illustrative listing, see http://blogs.indiewire.com/theplaylist/the-10-bestlast-man-on-earth-movies-20130418; see also http://www.google.com/#sclient
=psy-ab&q=apocalyptic+and+post-apocalyptic+fiction+movies (providing an
extensive list of apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic fiction).
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Man and his “last man” refers to the paradigmatic type of human being
that lives in liberal democracy at the end of History.185 But I am
proposing that we imagine a literal last man (or woman).
Imagine, then, that you find one other human being alive. How
have things changed? Unless the other person is really insane or
psychopathic, wouldn’t you be ecstatically grateful to have found
someone to be your companion? And would it matter any longer if that
person was of a different religion, or a different race, or if they had
supported the other political party, or had accepted same-sex marriage
and you had not, or vice-versa? Indeed, would it even matter if they
had been one of the enemy with whom your country had been at war?
In other words, would any of those things that used to divide you from
one another be of any importance? If not, doesn’t that show that these
causes of division are all social constructions—and even if you didn’t
believe this and believed instead that at least some of those divisions
were rooted in some transcendent truth, would that really matter any
longer? Instead of caring about all those things that used to divide you,
wouldn’t you cherish the other person? Wouldn’t that other person
now be the most important thing in the world to you? Indeed, wouldn’t
they be of immeasurable worth to you? Wouldn’t you want to listen to
them and really get to know them and to work with them so you could
help one another face your post-apocalyptic world together?186 And if
you would feel that way, isn’t it likely that the other person would feel
the same? Your chairs are gone. All you have is each another.187
So, if you are unable to see the other person, your antagonist in
conflict, or people more generally, as another child of God or as
having special human dignity for other reasons, and even if you can,
perhaps you could try to see them in this way, imagining that they
were the only other human being left alive on the planet. And perhaps
this could supply the motivation, or the additional motivation, you
need to make the effort to be empathetic and compassionate and to try
to achieve justice and peace between you.188
185
186

187

188

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
The movies of which I am aware that come closest to addressing such issues in
this imagined situation are The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (MetroGoldwyn-Mayer 1959) and Enemy Mine (20th Century Fox 1985). It is my
recollection of the latter movie that first inspired this thought experiment.
We often see something of this spirit, I think, in the way people pull together in
the wake of a natural disaster.
Let me be clear here. I am far from suggesting that we can simply wish away all
our differences, divisions, and conflicts through this simple “experiment in
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And before you answer that you have told people you wouldn’t
want to be around them “even if you were the last person on earth,” I
am not talking about some flippant expression you use to dismiss and
hurt someone who hurt you and whom you may even think you hate. I
am talking about the real deal. You have to try to imagine this really
happening. If you like, you can even imagine it being the same person
who hurt you or whom you think you hate. Perhaps in their case, you
would not have to get to know them because you already do, or at least
you think you do. But even so . . . even in their case . . . think hard,
Inspector . . . think very, very hard before you answer.
Dirty Harry (after a very long and thoughtful pause): Yeah, but
suppose they really are insane or a psychopath? Wouldn’t they just be
a punk?
Professor Hope, Professor Logie, Professor Roe, and Father
Pope (in unison): I think we all need another drink.
__________________
AFTERWORD
Then, as I probed them, one sprang up, and stared
With piteous recognition in fixed eyes,
Lifting distressful hands as if to bless
“I see you”189
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thought” (or even by seeing the other person as another “child of God”). After
all, we do not in fact live in such a post-apocalyptic world—at least not yet. My
goal is a much more modest one, yet quite ambitious enough. It is that we try to
treat one another better and achieve at least some increase in peace and justice,
as we seek to address and work through our differences, divisions, and conflicts,
by stimulating our moral imagination to “see” one another more clearly. Perhaps
then our clashing thymoi will not be quite as noisy, or as violent. If you would
like another movie reference, I suggest Avatar. See Avatar (20th Century Fox
2009) (“I see you”), http://james-camerons-avatar.wikia.com/wiki/I_See_You.
For the scene, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-u5SiCCmVv0.
Emphasis added. Cf. S ACKS , supra note 60, at 133-34, 203-04 (seeing the “face”
of the Other and of God), 159-60 (“Genesis is about recognition and nonrecognition in the deepest sense, about the willingness to accord dignity to the
other rather than see the other as a threat.”). In discussing “faces,” Sacks
acknowledges the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Id. at 278-79 n.6. For a concise
discussion of Levinas’ work addressing our ethical need to encounter the “face”
of the “infinite other” in order to receive the world we are given, see L INDA
R OSS M EYER , T HE J USTICE OF M ERCY 39-41 (2010).
In a comment on a draft of this Article Jack Sammons suggests that instead
of my decontextualizing thought experiment we might see each other more
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clearly and be more motivated to honor the human in the other if we imagined
the other in a richer and more realistic human context:
[F]or example, imagin[e] that the asshole at the checkout
counter just lost someone dear to him or her, someone who
mattered most in his or her life. Or, another example, imagine
the person you are hating at home, alone, praying. Or, my
favorite, imagine him or her as creative in a way that moves
you, i.e., imagine that he or she has carved a small, delicate,
and truly beautiful sculpture, or composed a nocturne, or
imagine him or her playing a chaconne on the guitar, and so
forth.
Email from Jack Sammons, supra note 160. I am certainly not opposed to such
an approach. Perhaps both can be offered and readers can then choose either to
try both approaches or alternatively to try the one they think would work better
for them (and these choices may be different for different readers).

